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Prisoner-to-Public Communication
Demetria D. Frank†
INTRODUCTION
On the forty-seventh anniversary of prison activist
George Jackson’s death, Heriberto “Sharky” Garcia refused food
at Folsom State Prison in California, initiating a national
prisoner hunger strike.1 Since the very possession of a cell phone
subjects a prisoner to discipline under the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Operations
Manual,2 Heriberto took great risks when he recorded and
posted to social media a scene of himself telling a prison guard,
“[b]urritos or not, not eating today . . . I’m hunger striking right
now.”3 Having no reason to believe the public would appreciate
† Associate Professor and Director of Diversity & Inclusion, University of
Memphis Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law. Much appreciation to the fellows of
Brothers Speaking Out for Change, who consistently provide me with points to ponder
and motivation to advance the rights of the incarcerated.
1 Ed Pilkington, Major Prison Strike Spreads Across US and Canada As
Inmates Refuse Food, GUARDIAN (Aug. 23, 2018, 6:00 AM EDT), https://www.the
guardian.com/us-news/2018/aug/23/prison-strike-us-canada-forced-labor-protest-activism
[https://perma.cc/UFE9-P92Z]. The demand document’s preamble declares that “Men and
women incarcerated in prisons across the nation declare a nationwide strike in response
to the riot in Lee Correctional Institution, a maximum-security prison in South
Carolina.” The demand document then sets out a list of ten demands, including the
following: (1) “[i]mprovements to the conditions of prisons and prison policies that
recognize the humanity of imprisoned men and women”; (2) “[a]n immediate end to
prison slavery” and demand that those imprisoned in the United States “be paid the
prevailing wage in their state or territory for their labor”; (3) rescind the Prison
Litigation Reform Act; (4) rescind the Truth in Sentencing Act and the Sentencing
Reform Act; (5) “[a]n immediate end to the racial overcharging, over sentencing, and
parole denials of [b]lack and brown humans”; (6) “[a]n immediate end to racist gang
enhancement laws targeting Black and brown humans”; (7) access to rehabilitation
programs and no denial of access to such programs because of a violent offense; (8)
funding for state prisons to offer more rehabilitation services; (9) reinstatement of Pell
Grants for prisoners and ex-felons; and (10) restoration of voting rights to all ex-felons
and those serving prison time and on parole. See Press Release: National Prisoners
Strike: August 21–September 9, 2018, https://www.dropbox.com/s/r5cr546jlscgkhj/Prison
%20Strike.pdf?dl=0 [https://perma.cc/5LGD-7TYM].
2 Chapter 4, art. 45, sec. 49020.18.3 notes, “[n]o inmate shall have access to, or
possession of, any telecommunication capability, including Internet accessible computers,
wireless devices such as pagers or handheld computing devices or cell phones without
approval from the Agency Information Security Officer.” CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB.,
ADULT INSTITUTIONS, PROGRAMS, AND PAROLE, OPERATIONS MANUAL 319–20, 407–11 (2018).
3 Pilkington, supra note 1.
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the significance of the strike’s chosen start date, or the stated
prisoner demands, Heriberto nevertheless peacefully urged the
outside free public to examine why prisoners would resort to
refuse food for twenty consecutive days. Heriberto clearly
understood that to improve the conditions of his strange home—
prison—the public must look beyond transgressions in favor of
basic human rights. With few other means of addressing the
public about prison woes, Heriberto undoubtedly intended this
rare prison scene to go viral.
The prisoner hunger strike occurred amidst the backdrop
of over two million people behind bars in United States prisons,
jails, and other correctional facilities.4 Although prison
overcrowding often presents major offenses to basic human
rights, prisoners have no political power to challenge conditions
of the prison system.5 The disparate burdens of the criminal
justice system in communities of color are well documented,6 as
are its historical roots in slavery, racism, and black
criminalization.7 Similarly, criminal justice practices like bail
4 Danielle Kaeble & Lauren Glaze, Correctional Populations in the United
States, 2016, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. (Apr. 2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
cpus16.pdf [https://perma.cc/VHF6-MFQM].
5 See infra notes 177–188, 190–203 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of
prisoner right to organize and the lack of prisoner’s access to the media, respectively).
Additionally, most prisoners are not allowed to vote. CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, ET AL., THE
SENTENCING PROJECT, 6 MILLION LOST VOTERS: STATE-LEVEL ESTIMATES OF FELONY
DISENFRANCHISEMENT, 2016, 3–4 (2016), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/6million-lost-voters-state-level-estimates-felony-disenfranchisement-2016/ [https://perma.cc/
L6J9-J5U8].
6 Disproportionally high incarceration rates for people of color and the poor create
“prison feeder communities” that suffer the severest social consequences such as concentrated
economic depression and high rates of crime due to release of hardened individuals back into
those communities. See ERNEST DRUCKER, A PLAGUE OF PRISONS: THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF
MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 56 (2011); ASHLEY NELLIS, THE SENTENCING PROJECT,
THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITY IN STATE PRISONS 3–6, 8 (2016),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/The-Color-of-Justice-Racial-a
nd-Ethnic-Disparity-in-State-Prisons.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZTL3-KTS9]; Marc Mauer,
Addressing Racial Disparities in Incarceration, 91 PRISON J. 87S, 88S–89S (2011). In some
communities, “one third or more of the young men who live there . . . are either currently
incarcerated, recently returned from prison, or on their way back in.” CRAIG HANEY,
REFORMING PUNISHMENT: PSYCHOLOGICAL LIMITS TO THE PAINS OF IMPRISONMENT 11–12
(2006). This movement of people in and out of prison increases neighborhood transiency,
making it difficult for residents to get to know and trust one another so that they can organize
and build social networks that address neighborhood problems. See Jeffrey D. Morenoff, et
al., Neighborhood Inequality, Collective Efficacy, and the Spatial Dynamics of Urban Violence,
39 CRIMINOLOGY 517, 518–19 (2001); Dina R. Rose & Todd R. Clear, Incarceration, Social
Capital, and Crime: Implications for Social Disorganization Theory, 36 CRIMINOLOGY 441,
442–43 (1998). Hence, the social fabric of the communities from which most prisoners are
drawn is heavily impacted by citizen losses to the justice system and the voice of prisoners
from these communities is even more important.
7 See
generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2012) (discussing the relationship
between incarceration and slavery, and the resulting systemic racism embedded within
the criminal justice and prison systems); see also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE
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bond requirements are documented to penalize the politically
powerless poor,8 and other practices have eliminated large
segments of communities of color from meaningful political
participation through felon disenfranchisement.9 Especially in
light of the grave consequences for socially oppressed groups, the
United States corrections system is in desperate need of repair
and transparency.10 Moreover, it simply doesn’t work.11
To promote prison accountability, transparency, and
public safety, this article proposes an unqualified and unfettered
right of prisoner-to-public communication.12 Although prisoners
possess an implied right to communicate with members of the
free public, all forms of external prisoner communication are
subject to prison administration surveillance.13 Prison
administrator review of prisoner external public communication
makes it difficult for the public to obtain the unfiltered prisoner
viewpoint, with little penological purpose for doing so.
Narratives about prison treatment are important,
especially considering that incarcerated people have inside
knowledge about prison life and the social circumstances resulting
in the loss of freedom. Incarcerated people are also likely the best
providers of prison accountability. Yet, the United States Supreme
Court has perpetuated the lack of prison accountability by
affording high deference to prison regulations that block free press
in prisons and limit the First Amendment rights of prisoners.14 The
resulting lack of corrections industry oversight has silenced the
voices of prisoners and subverted their existence.
This article proceeds in several parts. Part I provides a brief
description of the increased use of prison in the United States,
explaining why the impacts of incarceration and overcrowding
warrant consideration of the proposed prisoner-to-public
communication right. Part II discusses the Supreme Court’s
GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES 91–101, (Jeremy Travis, et al., eds., 2014).
8 Nannette A. Baker, The End of Money Bail?, 57 JUDGES’ J. 1, 1 (2018)
(“Estimates are that some 500,000 people are in jail in this country because they cannot
afford to pay the bond set for their release.”).
9 According to the Sentencing Project, approximately 6.1 million Americans
cannot vote due to felony conviction. UGGEN, supra note 5 at 3.
10 It is well documented that the homegrown human rights crisis of mass
incarceration has socially and economically debilitated many communities of color. See
Robert D. Crutchfield & Gregory A. Weeks, The Effects of Mass Incarceration on
Communities of Color, 32 ISSUES SCI. & TECH. 46, 46 (2015).
11 See infra Part I.
12 As explained in more detail infra at Introduction, the prisoner-to-public
communication right would encourage communication between prisoners and the free public.
13 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413, 418 (1974).
14 See, e.g., Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413 (1989); Turner v. Safley,
482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827–28 (1974).
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“hands-off” approach to prisoner rights and prison administration
while examining the role of the prisoner rights movement in
prisoner rights gains. This discussion illustrates the need for
unqualified and unfettered prisoner-to-public communication,
while emphasizing the importance of prisoner voice and public
accountability in promoting good prison practices.
Part III proposes an unqualified and unfettered right of
prisoner-to-public communication, explaining the necessary
features of the proposed right and notable limitations under
prevailing Supreme Court prisoner free speech cases. The article
closes explaining that the prisoner-to-public communication right
would help address the current lack of effective prison oversight that
has created serious impediments to addressing prison problems.
I.

BACKGROUND

A.

Increased Use of Prison15

The well-documented rise in incarceration rates beginning
in the 1970s has been exponential and rapid and gives the
necessary context in which we must evaluate the proposed
prisoner-to-public communication right.16 Since 1972, state prison
and jail populations have grown six times in size from about three
hundred thousand people to over 2.1 million in prisons and jails
in 2012.17 As the popular statistic goes, the United States
represents over 25% of the world’s total incarcerated population,
though it only comprises 5% of the world’s total population.18 The

15 This account is in no way exhaustive of the causes and consequences of mass
incarceration and merely highlights issues significant to this discussion on the proposed
right of prisoner-to-public communication. However, there is a wealth of literature in
this area. See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 7; CURT R. BLAKELY, PRISONS,
PENOLOGY & PENAL REFORM (2007); BAZ DREISINGER, INCARCERATION NATIONS: A
JOURNEY TO JUSTICE IN PRISONS AROUND THE WORLD (2016); MARTIN GUEVARA URBINA
& SOFIA ESPINOZA ÁLVAREZ, ET AL., ETHNICITY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE ERA OF
MASS INCARCERATION (2017); ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE
WAR ON CRIME: THE MAKING OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (2016); CHRISTOPHER
LORDAN & ROBERT DELLELO, THE FACTORY: A JOURNEY THROUGH THE PRISON
INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX (2016); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 7.
16 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 7, at 34–35 (stating that “the [United
States] imprisonment rate grew rapidly and continuously from 1972, increasing annually
by [six] to [eight] percent through 2000”).
17 See id. at 34–36. As a side note, around the same time the United States began
increasing its use of prison in 1972, the prisoner’s right movement of the 1960s was nearing
its end, culminating with the San Quentin riots in New York. See infra notes 84–92; see also
RONALD BERKMAN, OPENING THE GATES: THE RISE OF THE PRISONERS’ MOVEMENT, at 62 (1979).
18 See Combating Mass Incarceration—The Facts, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
(June 17, 2011), http://www.aclu.org/combating-mass-incarceration-facts-0 [https://perma.cc/
3FGT-ELKC].
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astronomical growth of prison use in the United States is
unprecedented in American history and globally unique.19
Irregular growth in national incarceration rates is not
completely explained by increases in crime rates.20 Indeed,
criminal justice policies and prisons are an elusive system, and,
as a number of works note, much of the increased use of prisons
is explained by political manipulation of public safety fears.21 For
example, the notorious “War on Drugs” made popular by
President Ronald Reagan22 ushered in exponential increases in
criminal convictions and use of longer prison sentences,
especially in prosecutions related to drug crimes.23 As a result,
states passed a multitude of laws in the 1980s and 1990s that

19 ERNEST DRUCKER, A PLAGUE OF PRISONS: THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF MASS
INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 38–39, 42–43 (2011). As Drucker notes, due to its largescale, rapid growth rate, and self-sustaining properties, some experts consider mass
incarceration an issue of public health, sharing characteristics similar to epidemics like
cholera and HIV/AIDS. Id. at 37–39.
20 See Bruce Western, et al., Crime, Punishment and American Inequality, in
SOCIAL INEQUALITY 771, 772 (Kathryn M. Neckerman, ed., 2004) https://pdfs.semantic
scholar.org/1fed/4fe0f5e826abb2149eeac797aad4263461ad.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ECRSPRX], stating:

The crime-imprisonment relationship is less clear cut. Between 1973 and 1995,
imprisonment rates rose through small increases and declines in violent crime.
From 1995 to 2000, incarceration increased steeply as the violent crime rate
plummeted. These simple aggregate trends lend at least superficial
plausibility to the idea that inequality, not crime, is behind the prison boom.
See MICHAEL W. FLAMM, LAW AND ORDER: STREET CRIME, CIVIL UNREST,
CRISIS OF LIBERALISM IN THE 1960S 125 (2005). Drawing heavily from Barry
Goldwater’s papers at the University of Arizona, Ronald Reagan’s papers at the Hoover
Institution, and Richard M. Nixon’s at the Nixon Library, Flamm discusses the
heightened fears over crime and ties “law and order” prevailing attitudes of the public to
political framing and debate surrounding crime in the 1960s and 1970s. Id. at 125–41;
see also VANESSA BARKER, THE POLITICS OF IMPRISONMENT: HOW THE DEMOCRATIC
PROCESS SHAPES THE WAY AMERICA PUNISHES OFFENDERS 151 (2009); JONATHAN
SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 75–78 (2007).
22 The media did its part by giving significant attention to inner city crack
babies, black-on-black crime, welfare mothers, violent “super-predator” youth, and other
negative aspects of urban communities intended to illustrate the need for more drastic
law enforcement measures. See supra note 21.
23 According to a report by the Sentencing Project, “[d]rug offenders in prisons
and jails have increased 1100% since 1980 [and] [n]early a half-million (493,800) persons
are in state or federal prison or local jail for a drug offense, compared to an estimated
41,100 in 1980.” MARC MAUER & RYAN S. KING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, A 25-YEAR
QUAGMIRE: THE WAR ON DRUGS AND ITS IMPACT ON AMERICAN SOCIETY 2 (2007); see also
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 7 at 34–36. This is despite the fact that the war
on drugs was ill-conceived and unnecessary. See Michael Tonry, Race and the War on
Drugs, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 25 (1994) (“The Reagan administration’s declaration of a
war on drugs resembles Argentina’s declaration of war against Nazi Germany in 1945.
It was late and beside the point. Just as it was clear by 1945 that Germany was in
military decline, it was clear in 1987 that drug use was in decline in the United States,
and that it had been since the early 1980s.” (footnote omitted)).
21
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increased prison terms and the likelihood of imprisonment.24
These measures were not solely aimed at “big time” drug dealers,
however. The new laws’ emphases on prosecuting low-level drug
dealers and personal use drug crimes led to an exponential
increase in prison populations.25 Additional federal policies,
including funding programs incentivizing local criminal prosecution
of drug crimes, further solidified America’s newfound devotion to
incarceration as the primary method of addressing crime.26 Despite
the enormous financial burden to taxpayers and devastating effects
on communities and public safety, the public generally supported
the harsher laws and penalties.27
Increased prison use is also strongly associated with the
deinstitutionalization of mental health.28 Individuals with mental
24 See RAM SUBRAMANIAN & RUTH DELANEY, VERA INST. OF JUST., PLAYBOOK
CHANGE? STATES RECONSIDER MANDATORY SENTENCES 5–7 (2014),
https://storage.googleapis.com/vera-web-assets/downloads/Publications/playbook-forchange-states-reconsider-mandatory-sentences/legacy_downloads/mandatorysentences-policy-report-v3.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KE5-6BF3]. There has been some
admission by policymakers that the harsh drug and sentencing policies of the 1980s and
90s went too far. See Peter Baker, Bill Clinton Concedes His Crime Law Jailed Too Many
for Too Long, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/16/us/
politics/bill-clinton-concedes-his-crime-law-jailed-too-many-for-too-long.html [https://
perma.cc/S9AS-2DYC]. Accordingly, justice reforms over the last several years have
largely approached reducing prison populations by rolling back minimum penalties
associated with drug crimes. For example, since 2000 at least eighteen states increased
judicial discretion to judges at sentencing in cases where a mandatory sentence would
normally apply including Connecticut, New Jersey, Louisiana, Georgia, and Hawaii.
SUBRAMANIAN & DELANEY, supra note 24, at 8–10 (2014). “[A]t least 13 states have
passed laws adjusting or limiting sentence enhancements, including” Nevada, Louisiana,
Kentucky, Colorado, and Indiana. Id. at 10–11. “[A]t least 17 states and the federal
government have passed laws repealing mandatory minimums or revising them
downward for certain offenses,” including North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Delaware, and Ohio. Id. at 11–12. These reforms, while applauded, have scarcely
impacted detention facility populations overall and have had a disproportionate impact
on communities of color. See id. at 12. Moreover, the prisoners’ rights movement of the
1960s and early 1970s illustrates that prisons were in need of reform well before
contemporary mass incarceration. See discussion infra notes 118–57.
25 See RYAN S. KING & MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE WAR ON
MARIJUANA: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE WAR ON DRUGS IN THE 1990S 4 (2005)
https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/A-25-Year-Quagmire-TheWar-On-Drugs-and-Its-Impact-on-American-Society.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y6J4-MDXC]
(noting that “[a]s of 2002, marijuana arrests comprised 45% of all drug arrests, and of
these, possession arrests constituted 88% of all marijuana arrests. While marijuana
trafficking arrests declined as a proportion of all drug arrests during this period [from
1990 to 2002], the proportion for marijuana possession increased by two-thirds.”).
Additionally, the study notes that from 1990 to 2002, “[a]rrests for violent crimes
dropped 33% and felony drug crimes dropped 39%” but that “misdemeanor drug arrests
increased by 143%, driven by growth in marijuana arrests.” Id. at 15–16.
26 See e.g., Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 13701 (2012)).
27 See FLAMM, supra note 21 at 183–85.
28 Bernard E. Harcourt, From the Asylum to the Prison: Rethinking the
Incarceration Revolution, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1751, 1780 (2006) (estimating that
deinstitutionalization from 1971 to 1996 accounts “for roughly 28 to 86 percent of prison
inmates suffering from mental illness”). But see Steven Raphael & Michael A. Stoll,
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illness and substance abuse disorders are grossly overrepresented in
U.S. jails and prisons with an estimated 14 to 26 percent of
individuals in federal and state prisons and jails suffering from a
serious mental illness.29 Federally funded programs and costshifting initiatives resulted in states closing a substantial number of
mental hospitals, reducing the availability of inpatient care
facilities.30 The availability of new psychotropic drugs also
influenced this movement away from state-run mental facilities in
the decades prior to increased prison use, as more individuals began
treatment with medication in their own communities.31
Consequently, many individuals that would be treated or housed in
mental facilities prior to the deinstitutionalization movement are
now living in prisons and jails in every state, where they experience
serious mental healthcare access and diagnosis challenges.
Mass incarceration has also been linked to slavery, Jim
Crow Laws, and longtime bias associations with blacks and
crime.32 Although the civil rights movement made way for a
number of new rights for black Americans, it did little to address
the persistent socioeconomic conditions depressing black
communities.33 Scholars have also linked the exponential growth

Assessing the Contribution of the Deinstitutionalization of the Mentally Ill to Growth in the
U.S. Incarceration Rate, 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 190 (2013) (“[Four to seven] percent of
incarceration growth between 1980 and 2000 can be attributed to deinstitutionalization.”).
29 Jennifer Bronson & Marcus Berzofsky, INDICATORS OF MENTAL HEALTH
PROBLEMS OF REPORTED BY PRISON AND JAIL INMATES, 2011–2012 (2017) http://www.
bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=5946 [https://perma.cc/ZAD3-3YN4]. The rate of severe
mental illness in general populations is only between 3.9 and 5 percent. Id.
30 See Harcourt, supra note 28, at 1760 n.43.
31 See
William Gronfein Psychotropic Drugs and the Origins of
Deinstitutionalization, 32 SOC. PROBS. 437, 450 (1985).
32 See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 7. Since African beginnings in the colonies
and specifically with Black Codes enacted following slavery, blackness has largely been
defined through criminality. See generally KHALIL GIBRAN MUHAMMAD, THE CONDEMNATION
OF BLACKNESS: RACE, CRIME, AND THE MAKING OF MODERN URBAN AMERICA (2010).
33 There are overwhelming economic disparities between blacks and whites in
every measurable economic category. See generally BRUCE J. SCHULMAN, FROM COTTON
BELT TO SUNBELT: FEDERAL POLICY, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND THE TRANSFORMATION
OF THE SOUTH, 1938–1980 (1991); CHANDLER DAVIDSON & BERNARD GROFMAN, QUIET
REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965–1990 (1994);
LAWRENCE J. HANKS, THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT IN THREE
GEORGIA COUNTIES (1987); MANNING MARABLE, HOW CAPITALISM UNDERDEVELOPED
BLACK AMERICA; PROBLEMS IN RACE, POLITICAL ECONOMY, AND SOCIETY (1983); JULIET E.
K. WALKER, THE HISTORY OF BLACK BUSINESS IN AMERICA: CAPITALISM, RACE,
ENTREPRENEURSHIP (MacMillan Library Reference USA, 1998).

122

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:1

of incarceration in the United States to deindustrialization34 and
the school-to-prison pipeline.35
Regardless of its causes, the increased use of prison as
the primary means of addressing crime has not been without
great costs to the conditions of prisons and life for prisoners. A
number of studies have confirmed that high rates of
incarceration have created additional crime in over-incarcerated
communities, instead of less.36 A growing body of literature also
suggests that over-incarcerated communities have been costly to
taxpayers37 and incarceration is often unnecessary to promote
appropriate goals of criminal justice.38
B.

Worsened Prison Conditions and Impact on Incarcerated
Individuals

The problems of overcrowding are not only unconstitutional
in many instances, but are also unsanitary, dangerous, and even
deadly.39 The problem of overcrowding became so great in the state
of California that in 2011 the Supreme Court declared California’s
prisons unconstitutional, mandating that the state reduce its
prison population and requiring the release of about thirty
thousand convicted felons.40 As noted by the Supreme Court in
Brown v. Plata, “overcrowding may prevent immediate medical
attention necessary to avoid suffering, death, or spread of
disease.”41 At the time of the litigation, “California’s correctional
34 See
ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? 90 (2003) (“The
deindustrialization processes that resulted in plant shutdowns throughout the country
created a huge pool of vulnerable human beings, a pool of people for whom no further
jobs were available.”).
35 Zero-tolerance and other harsh polices pervade our education and youth
justice system despite social and psychological literature suggesting these policies are
more harmful than good and contribute to the likelihood youth will enter prison as an
adult. Christopher A. Mallett, The School-to-Prison Pipeline: Disproportionate Impact on
Vulnerable Children and Adolescents, 49 EDUC. & URB. SOC’Y 562 (2017).
36 See e.g., Todd Clear et al., Coercive Mobility and Crime: A Preliminary
Examination of Concentrated Incarceration and Social Disorganization, 20 JUST. Q. 33,
55 (2003); Natasha A. Frost & Laura A. Gross, Coercive Mobility and the Impact of
Prison-Cycling on Communities, 57 CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE 459, 459–74 (2012);
Crutchfield & Weeks, supra note 10, at 46–48.
37 See CHRISTIAN HENRICHSON & RUTH DELANEY, VERA INST. OF JUST., THE
PRICE OF PRISONS: WHAT INCARCERATION COSTS TAXPAYERS 13 (2012); MICHAEL
MCLAUGHLIN ET AL., CONCORDANCE INST. FOR ADVANCING SOC. JUST., THE ECONOMIC
BURDEN OF INCARCERATION IN THE U.S. 4 (2016); Harry J. Holzer, et al., The Economic
Costs of Childhood Poverty in the United States, 149 J. CHILD. & POVERTY 41, 42 (2008).
38 JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., BRENNAN CTR FOR JUST., HOW MANY AMERICANS ARE
UNNECESSARILY INCARCERATED? 46 (2016) https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/
files/publications/Unnecessarily_Incarcerated.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PTR-CVAH].
39 Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 520 (2011).
40 Id. at 501, 545.
41 Id. at 520.
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facilities held some [one hundred fifty-six thousand
people]. . . . nearly double the number that California’s prisons
were designed to hold.”42 The Court essentially concluded that
prison overcrowding is a human rights issue.
The rise in prison populations has increased problematic
conditions within U.S. prison walls necessitating public access to
prisoners’ unfettered perspective about prison life.43 In addition,
overcrowding results in “restricted living space” creating
additional “losses [to individual] privacy and human dignity.”44
Overcrowded conditions can become so extreme that prison
officials sometimes resort to double-celling inmates and
insufficient housing assignments45 such as placing large numbers
of prisoners in gymnasiums.46 Further, overcrowding results in
the rapid deterioration of facilities, and restricted access to
important living areas such as dining halls and bathrooms.47
Crowded prison living conditions are also associated with
prisoner idleness and increased prison violence.48 Crowded
correctional facilities are also less safe because the supervisory
capacity of staff is impaired, resulting in chaotic prison
Id. at 501.
See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NATION BEHIND BARS: A HUMAN
RIGHTS SOLUTION 5 (2011), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/
2014_US_Nation_Behind_Bars_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/HU56-PMMX] (explaining that
“[m]any of the harsh laws adopted decades ago remain on the books, supplemented by newer
ones, because ‘tough-on-crime’ has remained a default approach for all too many politicians”).
44 HANS JÖRG ALBRECHT,
PRISON OVERCROWDING, FINDING EFFECTIVE
SOLUTIONS, STRATEGIES AND BEST PRACTICES AGAINST OVERCROWDING IN CORRECTIONAL
FACILITIES 33, (United Nations Asia & Far E. Inst. for the Prevention of Crime and
Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI) ed., 2011); see also Susanna Y. Chung, Note,
Prison Overcrowding: Standards in Determining Eighth Amendment Violations, 68
FORDHAM L. REV. 2351, 2351–52 (2000).
45 ALBRECHT, supra note 44, at 8, 33. According to the Correctional Association
of New York, “double celling” refers to “forcing two people to share a small cell that was
designed for one inhabitant, for months, or sometimes even years” while “‘[d]oublebunking’ is a practice where bunk beds are used in a dormitory setting generally found
in medium-security facilities.” What We Know: on Double-Ceiling, Double-Bunking, and
Prison Downsizing, CORR. ASS’N. OF N.Y. (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.correctional
association.org/news/what-we-know-on-double-celling-double-bunking-and-prison-down
sizing [https://perma.cc/ZX9D-P8J9]. However, the Supreme Court has ruled that
“double celling” is not unconstitutional cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 339, 352 (1981).
46 Laura Sullivan, San Quentin’s Prison Becomes One Massive Cell, NPR (July
7, 2008, 11:43 AM ET), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=92296114
[https://perma.cc/HZ75-L2WL].
47 Caitlin Curley, When Prison Overcrowding Becomes Cruel & Unusual
Punishment, GENFKD (Feb. 9, 2016, 4:49 PM EST), http://www.genfkd.org/prisonovercrowding-cruel-unusual-punishment [http://perma.cc/6N5R-MWTZ].
48 Increased prison violence is at least in part due to high staff turnover in
overcrowded facilities. Craig Haney, The Wages of Prison Overcrowding: Harmful
Psychological Consequences and Dysfunctional Correctional Reactions, 22 WASH. U. J.L.
& POL’Y 265, 275–76 (2006); Lauren Salins & Shepard Simpson, Note, Efforts to Fix a
Broken System: Brown v. Plata and the Prison Overcrowding Epidemic, 44 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 1153, 1161–62 (2013) (stating “extensive inmate idleness” leads to prison violence).
42
43
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environments and less opportunities for prisoners to remain in
contact with the outside world.49 As a result, crowded facilities
“diminish the corrections system’s ability to reduce recidivism,”
presenting serious threats to public safety.50
The problematic conditions created by overcrowding
inevitably impact the physical and mental health of all
prisoners, as well as their access to mental healthcare and
ability to rehabilitate while serving time.51 Mental and physical
health issues are nearly impossible to address in overcrowded
and chaotic prison environments where symptoms can remain
unaddressed, undiagnosed, and worsen.52 For example, “[t]he
prison environment may exacerbate health conditions such as
asthma because of poor ventilation, overcrowding, and stress.”53
Moreover, the number of aging prisoners and prisoners who
suffer from mental illness has increased markedly along with
prison growth.54 Appropriate services for the full range of mental
illness seen by prisons and accommodations for prisons’ aging
population are also scarce.55
Generally, educational and rehabilitative programs
become less available in overcrowded facilities because of a
prison’s inability to accommodate large numbers of prisoners.56
When the incarcerated are not given the opportunity to
rehabilitate or acquire skills helpful to life on the outside, they

49 Salins & Simpson, supra note 48, at 1161–62; ALBRECHT, supra note 44, at
33–34 (noting that one way prisons have managed overcrowding is by “transfer[ing
inmates] from overcrowded facilities to less crowded but far away prisons” that would
limit prisoner access to family members). Additionally, some prison facilities have
resorted to reducing prisoners’ visitation time purportedly due to shortcomings in
managing the influx of visitors due to staff shortages. See Gaby Galvin, Underfunded,
Overcrowded State Prisons Struggle with Reform, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (July 26,
2017, 1:30 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/articles/2017-07-26/under
staffed-and-overcrowded-state-prisons-crippled-by-budget-constraints-bad-leadership
[https://perma.cc/9JYZ-AETY] (noting, “[r]ecreation, family visits and training programs
are often the first to go when staffing levels dip”). Note that adequate visitation practices
have long been a right sought by prisoners and was one of the modest demands made by
prisoners in the Folsom Manifesto during the 1970 Folsom strike originating at San
Quentin prison in California.
50 Salins & Simpson, supra note 48, at 1162.
51 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 7, at 222–23 (noting that overcrowding
is “particularly associated with a serious degeneration of mental health” and “raise[s]
concerns about transmission of airborne infections”).
52 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 7, at 221–24; see also Zulficar Gregory
Restum, Public Implications of Substandard Health Care, 95 AM J PUB. HEALTH 1689–91
(Oct. 2005) (noting, that prisoners bring with them “infectious diseases from impoverished
home environments that are breeding grounds for HIV/AIDS, hepatitis C, and tuberculosis,
the three most prevalent communicable diseases in America’s prisons today”).
53 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 7 at 223.
54 Id. at 205, 211.
55 See id at 211–12.
56 Id. at 330.
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are more likely to recidivate following release.57 Since most
prisoners will one day rejoin society, the availability of
rehabilitative programming and transition management services
is vital to success on release.58 Yet, a number of legal and social
realities make the task of reentering society extremely difficult,
with few systems in place to assist prisoners,59 leaving many with
few tools to reintegrate into society upon release.60
Even without overcrowding, the impacts of imprisonment
are debilitating. Incarcerated individuals are vulnerable to
abuses of power by prison authorities, warranting the prisonerto-public communication right.61 As the mid-1970s saw a rise in
prison populations, and led to prison overcrowding, the dominant
thought of the rehabilitative model for prisons shifted to one of
punishment.62 As a result, daily life for prisoners became harsher
with public acquiescence to the “penal harm” movement.63 Penal
harm movement policies, which largely remain in prisons today,
involve a combination of physical, mental, and social
punishments, intended to make the daily life of incarcerated
people miserable.64 A report by the Human Rights Watch reminds
how extreme a form of punishment imprisonment really is:
Prisoners lose their liberty, autonomy, and the freedom to exercise fully
most rights. They are cut off from families, friends, and communities.
Children lose their parents to prison, and parents lose their children. In
prison, a person’s ability to work, express themselves, and engage in
activities that promote what human rights law calls the “free and full
development of the personality,” is severely restricted. In many prisons,
the health and safety of prisoners, as well as their dignity and privacy,

57 See KAMALA MALLIK-KANE & CHRISTY A. VISHNER, HEALTH AND PRISONER
REENTRY: HOW PHYSICAL, MENTAL, AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE CONDITIONS SHAPE THE
PROCESS OF REINTEGRATION 1–5 (Urb. Inst. Just. Pol’y Ctr. 2008); see also COUNCIL OF
STATE GOV’TS JUSTICE CTR., REDUCING RECIDIVISM AND IMPROVING OTHER OUTCOMES
FOR YOUNG ADULTS IN THE JUVENILE AND ADULT CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS (2015).
58 See MALLIK-KANE & VISHNER, supra note 57, at 61.
59 See id. at 14–19; see also Adam P. Hellegers, Comment, Reforming HUD’s
“One-Strike” Public Housing Evictions Through Tenant Participation, 90 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 323, 324 (1999).
60 See DAVIS, supra at note 34, at 53–59 (discussing the “disestablishment
of . . . prison educational programs”); see also ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 140–77.
61 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 7, at 157–201.
62 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 7, at 163–69; see also Francis T.
Cullen, Assessing the Penal Harm Movement, 31 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ., 338, 34258 (1995).
63 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 7, at 163–69.; Cullen, supra note 62,
at 341–43.
64 The overuse of solitary confinement in American prisons illustrates the
results of the penal harm movement well. For example, according to the Equal Justice
Initiative, “[a]bout 75,000 people in the United States are held in solitary confinement,
spending [twenty-three] or more hours a day in small cells, allowed out only for showers,
brief exercise, or medical visits, without telephone calls or visits from family members.”
Mass Incarceration: Prison Conditions, EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, https://eji.org/massincarceration/prison-conditions [https://perma.cc/A77Z-57MP].
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are threatened by overcrowding, harsh measures such as solitary
confinement, and poor physical conditions and sanitation, not to
mention rape and other forms of violence.65

The wide range of problems resulting from prison life generally
and especially overcrowded systems illustrate why the ability of
prisoners to communicate with the public without prison
interference is so important. Notwithstanding the risk of serious
human rights violations resulting from overcrowding, the
Supreme Court has left the regulation of prison conditions to
prison administrators unchecked.
II.

PRISONER RIGHTS AND THE SUPREME COURT

A.

The Supreme Court’s Hands-Off Approach

Understanding the rise of mass incarceration and its
impacts might be challenging without the appreciation that
people convicted of crimes have always been treated inhumanely
alongside the silent acquiescence of courts. Following
emancipation, only those indebted to society due to commission
of a crime were supposedly subjected to the immoral elements of
legal slavery. In fact, while the Thirteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution abolished slavery, it expanded state
authority over convicted criminals.66 Indeed, the Thirteenth
Amendment adopted in 1865 aptly describes nineteenth century
prevailing thought of the legal rights and personage status of
prisoners that influences prison practices today:
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist
within the United States or any place subject to their jurisdiction.67

During the early development of modern prisons, incarcerated
people were not only slaves of the state,68 but also “civilly dead,”
the legal equivalent of physically dead.69 While the personage
status of “slave of the state,” meant literal slavery at the hands
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 43, at 8 (footnote omitted).
See generally DENNIS CHILDS, SLAVES OF THE STATE: BLACK INCARCERATION
FROM THE CHAIN GANG TO THE PENITENTIARY (2015); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
67 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
68 See Ruffin v. Virginia, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (Va. 1871); see also Pervear
v. Massachusetts, 72 U.S (5 Wall.) 475, 479–80 (1866) (where the Supreme Court initially
decided that prisoners had no constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment at the hands of the state under the Eighth Amendment).
69 In 1799, New York became the first state to adopt a civil death statute for
convicted felons. Thereafter, other states followed suit, passing similar statutes or imposing
specific disabilities on felons. See Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking
Punishment in the Era of Mass Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1798–1803 (2012).
65
66
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of the state,70 “civil death” meant that the prisoner permanently
lost all civil rights once convicted and imprisoned.71 The concept
of criminals as civiliter mortuus or civil decedents was plainly
described in the 1871 state of Virginia decision Ruffin v.
Commonwealth, which reiterated the Thirteenth Amendment’s
demand that a convicted man is a slave of the state during the
term of imprisonment and added that “his estate, if he has any,
is administered like that of a dead man.”72
Despite this harsh notion, state civil death statutes
existed in at least eighteen states and were perceived by
lawmakers and the public as more humane than the near and
certain death criminal penalties previous generations
witnessed.73 The California Penal Code, for example, directed
that “[a] sentence for imprisonment in a [s]tate [p]rison for any
term less than for life suspends all the civil rights of the person
so sentenced, and forfeits all public offices and all private trusts,
authority, or power during such imprisonment” and that “[a]
person sentenced to imprisonment in the State Prison for life is
thereafter deemed civilly dead.”74 Under such civil death
statutes, conviction of crime meant no legal identity for the
individual while in prison and severe limitations on rights even
after release from prison and supposed restoration of liberty.75

70 The convict lease system is the clearest example of state early treatment of
prisoners as slaves. For more on the convict lease system see ALEX LICHTENSTEIN, TWICE
THE WORK OF FREE LABOR: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CONVICT LABOR IN THE NEW
SOUTH (1996).
71 See Ruffin, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) at 796 (“He has, as a consequence of his crime,
not only forfeited his liberty, but all his personal rights except those which the law in its
humanity accords to him. He is for the time being the slave of the State.”).
72 Id.
73 See Chin, supra note 69, at 1796. For example, states began moving away
from “civil death” statutes in favor of legal disabilities such as felon disenfranchisement
imposed on those convicted of felonies. Id. at 1799–1803. States also began to move away
from perpetual retribution, in favor of parole and probation systems. Id. at 1804–05.
Moreover, to place the public view of this legal status of prisoners in context in the late
1800s, note that early prisons were adopted as a more humane replacement to public
degradation as the penalty for minor offenses, and physical mutilation or capital
punishment (death) as the penalty for all felony offenses. Id. Notwithstanding the deeply
embedded connections with slavery, civil death statutes, and disproportionate prison
sentences were accepted well beyond abolition. Id. at 1798; see also DAVIS, supra note 34,
at 27 (“In many ways, the penitentiary was a vast improvement over the many forms of
capital and corporal punishment inherited from the English.” (emphasis omitted)).
Additionally, although civil death statutes were not pervasive, and use began to decline
by the 1980s, a “system of collateral consequences applicable to people convicted of
crimes” began to quickly emerge in the regulatory state. See Chin, supra note 69, at 1799.
74 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 673–74 (1871) (repealed and superseded 1975).
75 ERIC CUMMINS, THE RISE & FALL OF CALIFORNIA’S RADICAL PRISON 24–25
(Stan. Univ. Press, 1994) (explaining that much like state limitations on prisoner right
restorations today, convicted felons in California had no right to vote, hold office, make
contracts, or own property).
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Because of the concept of prisoner “civil death,” courts did
not readily interfere with the administration of correctional
institutions in the early years of prisons.76 With the exception of
scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment for cruel and unusual
punishment, conviction of a crime constructively meant complete
forfeiture of constitutional rights for prisoners and courts
exercised extreme judicial restraint in shaping how prisons
operated.77 This cruel dichotomy created a class of individuals
that essentially had no rights and no protections—a class of
slaves behind bars. Even at the turn of the nineteenth century
during the Progressive Era, the Supreme Court maintained its
hands-off approach toward prison administration.78
By the end of World War II, urban populations grew, and
so did poverty, crime, and prison populations. Because of the
enormous expense of building prisons in a post-war era,
however, most states simply added new prisoners to existing
facilities, eventually leading to overcrowding and poorer
conditions.79 The “hands-off” approach traditionally taken by
courts proved detrimental and prisons entered a crisis in terms
of conditions and treatment of prisoners in the 1970s.80 In the
period following, prisoners began connecting their everyday life
in prisons to the pursuit of social and racial justice.81
B.

The Prisoner Rights Movement

Following the civil rights era and worsening conditions of
prisons as a result of the hands-off approach by courts, prisoners
began to realize the power of their voice alongside the Black Power
movement in the 1960s and 70s.82 On the inside, racism was just
76 See Christopher E. Smith, Black Muslims and the Development of Prisoners’
Rights, 24 J, BLACK STUD. 131, 131 (1993) (noting that “[u]ntil the 1960’s, the judiciary
had taken a hands-off approach to issues related to the constitutional rights of prisoners”
and that “[j]udges avoided deciding cases . . . or . . . deferr[ed] to correctional officials
because of their supposed expertise in treating offenders”).
77 See id.; see also Pervear v. Massachusetts, 72 U.S (5 Wall.) 475, 480 (1866).
78 See Smith, supra note 76, at 131.
79 DAVIS, supra note 34, at 12–13.
80 See Smith, supra note 76, at 131; Haney, supra note 48, at 269–73.
81 See, e.g., Dan Berger, Captive Nation: Black Prison Organizing in the Civil
Rights Era, 7 (North Carolina Press, 2014) (noting that “the period between 1955 and 1980
was remarkable not only for the expanded criminalization and state punishment of black
radicalism . . . . [m]ore notable was the way in which black activists turned prisons
into . . . schools of liberation: training grounds and battlegrounds in larger struggles
against racism in the form of state violence”).
82 Zoe Colley, War Without Terms: George Jackson, Black Power and the
American Radical Prison Rights Movement, 1941–1971, J. HIST. ASS’N 266, 268–69, 275
(2016) (noting that “it is evident that the political activity of [George] Jackson, Nolen
and their supporters was intricately bound up with the rise of the black power movement
across America in the post-1966 years”); CUMMINS, supra note 75, at 61–65. Additionally,
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as much a part of the environment as it was on the outside.83
Because prisoners lacked access to other means of sociopolitical
participation, they began pushing the courts and public to
recognize the human constitutional protections of prisoners.
During the years following the civil rights movement, many
prisoners became activists while incarcerated, organizing for better
treatment and more rights.84 Organizations, like the Nation of
Islam, began prison ministries on the inside that had strong
connections to Black Nationalists with giant voices like Malcolm X,
who was now on the outside.85 As marginalized groups were
extended constitutional protections on the outside, “[p]risoners
began to assert newfound identity as rights-bearing persons.”86
Despite the Supreme Court’s history of resistance to
interfering with prison administration,87 the Warren Court
ushered in modest gains for prisoners during the prisoner rights
movement.88 For example, the Supreme Court considered Jones
v. Cunningham and decided that state inmates have the right to
file a writ of habeas corpus in federal court challenging the
legality of sentencing and conditions of imprisonment.89 A year
Caryl Chessman who arrived at San Quentin prison in 1941, is credited with turning the
attention of California Bay Area political activists toward prison. Chessman, a death row
prisoner, provided fellow inmates “a model of how a convict could gain power through
writing and education and ten use it to seek his freedom.” CUMMINS, supra note 75, at
61–65. Following Chessman’s legacy, and in the midst of the civil rights movement, Black
Nation of Islam members became the movement’s in-prison political arm and by 1960
Black Muslim membership “was estimated at 65,000 to 100,00 nationwide, a good
portion inside prisons.” Id.; see also DAVIS, supra note 34, at 55–56.
83 Berger, supra at note 81, at 12–13, 99–100 (noting that when George
Jackson entered prison in 1960, he “inhabited a world even more sharply polarized by
race than the neighborhoods he had once called home” and “[m]any prison officials not
only nurtured racism but demanded absolute obedience to their authority, no matter how
capricious their demands”).
84 Smith, supra note 76, at 131–32.
85 Id. at 133; see also Colley, supra note 82, at 270, 275. The emergence of
Muslim leaders in prison also promoted unity amongst black prisoners, which was
needed in the black prison movement as blacks in prisons were previously fragmented
and disorganized. BERKMAN, supra note 17, at 55.
86 HANEY, supra note 6, at 59.
87 Smith, supra note 76, at 131.
88 See Haines v. Kerner 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972) (ruling courts should
generously construe the work of pro se plaintiffs); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972)
(holding prisoners should enjoy the right to practice their religion); Johnson v. Avery, 393
U.S. 483, 490 (1969) (holding state regulations that would absolutely bar inmate assistance
with court papers and filings unconstitutional); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546, 546 (1964)
(per curiam) (ruling prisoners have the right to protection under the Civil Rights Act of
1871); Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 240–44 (1963) (deciding state inmates have the
right to file a court order of habeas corpus and challenge both the legality of their
sentencing and the conditions of their imprisonment); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660,
666–67 (1962) (ruling that the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment applied to states and state prisons); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961)
(allowing individual government actors to be sued for unconstitutional acts).
89 Cunningham, 371 U.S. at 244.
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later, the Court decided that prisoners have some First
Amendment religious freedoms under the Civil Rights Act of
1871 in Cooper v. Pate.90 Following Cooper, prisoners began
using the court system more aggressively to air grievances about
prison conditions, and federal courts began addressing prisoner
petitions on the merits for the first time.
In all likelihood, “prisoners anticipated the overcrowding
of mass incarceration and tried to curb its growth” in the quest
for prisoner rights.91 By the 1970s, prisoners were getting
attention across the United States due not only to prisoner
lawsuits, but also to a series of prison demonstrations including a
four-day prison riot that erupted at Attica Prison in New York.92
The Attica riots are significant because for the first time, the
public became nationally aware of the United States’ appalling
prison policies.93
The Supreme Court even purportedly abandoned its handsoff approach in Procunier v. Martinez, recognizing that prisoners
do not completely shed constitutional rights due to conviction.94
Although the Court was characteristically hesitant to recognize
any specific right on behalf of prisoners,95 it did recognize a right on
behalf of free citizens to access prisoner speech, stating:

See Pate, 378 U.S. at 546.
Robert T. Chase, We Are Not Slaves: Rethinking the Rise of the Carceral
States Through the Lens of the Prisoners’ Rights Movement, 102 J. AM. HIST. 73, 75–77
(2015) (discussing the increase in prisoners’ rights suits post-Cooper v. Pate).
92 In September 1971, inmates seized control of the prison in protest of living
conditions, including chronic overcrowding, mail censorship, and prison restrictions that
limited Attica prisoners to one shower per week and one roll of toilet paper each month.
Berger, supra note 81, at 2–3. The catalyst for the Attica riots is said to be the death of
prison revolutionary George Jackson who was shot in the back by prison guards at San
Quentin prison in August 1971, while allegedly trying to escape. Id. at 133–38. Although
New York Correction Commissioner Russell Oswald agreed to honor the Attica prisoners’
demand for better living conditions, negotiations failed after prisoners demanded amnesty.
Following Governor Rockefeller’s order that the prison be taken back by force by National
Guardsmen, prison guards and police, thirty-nine men were killed at the facility, including
ten hostages. See Chase, supra note 91, at 74. Due to an Attica governmental cover-up of
ten hostages shot by prison guards, the public began to grow more skeptical of prison
administration. See id. at 74–75; see also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 7, at 115.
93 See Chase, supra note 91, at 75; see also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note
7, at 115 n.12. The Attica prisoner demands included requests related to prisoner First
Amendment rights, including the right to political participation, outside visitation, and
union organizing. However, in the months following the Attica riot, prison officials raided
a number of prisons around the country taking preventative action to destroy organizing
efforts among prisoners. See Attica Prison Liberation Faction, Manifesto of Demands 1971,
LIBCOM.ORG:BLOG (Jan. 6, 2012, 7:09 PM) https://libcom.org/blog/attica-prison-liberationfaction-manifesto-demands-1971-06012012 [https://perma.cc/ND93-QNHL].
94 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 422–23 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
concurring), rev’d on other grounds, Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989).
95 Id. at 408 (“[W]e have no occasion to consider the extent to which an individual’s
right to free speech survives incarceration, for a narrower basis of decision is at hand.”).
90
91

2018]

PRISONER-TO-PUBLIC COMMUNICATION

131

[A] policy of judicial restraint cannot encompass any failure to take
cognizance of valid constitutional claims whether arising in a federal
or state institution. When a prison regulation or practice offends a
fundamental constitutional guarantee, federal courts will discharge
their duty to protect constitutional rights.96

Additional notable gains during the prisoner rights movement
included Estelle v. Gamble, where the Supreme Court held that
deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs
amounted to cruel and unusual punishment.97 Then in the
Bounds v. Smith opinion authored by Justice Marshall, the
Court declared that states are required to provide meaningful
assistance to prisoners preparing legal papers.98 In 1980, a
federal court ruled against the state of Texas’s use of abusive
convict guards to control prison populations with rape and other
forms of physical abuse.99 In addition to guaranteeing important
rights of prisoners, these cases illustrate some of the obstacles
prisoners have had to historically overcome to bring light to the
“hidden world of prison society.”100
Unfortunately, many of the rights granted to prisoners
during the prisoner rights movement were significantly limited
or narrowed under the more conservative Burger and
Rehnquist Courts.
C.

Retreat to the Hands-Off Doctrine: Turner v. Safley

Supposed increases in crime on the heels of the prisoner
rights movement along with “law and order” political rhetoric,
discussed infra, heightened public fears about crime, prompting
rapid retreat by courts to a constructive hands-off deference to
prison officials.101 The tide seemed to change permanently for
prisoner rights with Bell v. Wolfish, where the Supreme Court
overturned a lower court ruling that found practices in a New
York City jail unconstitutional and held that even pretrial
detainees could be subjected to intrusive body searches.102
Despite the previous favorable prisoner free speech
ruling in Martinez, in 1987 the Court decided Turner v. Safley,
96 Id. at 405–06. The same term, however, the Court declined to recognize
media access rights to face-to-face interviews with prisoners in Pell v. Procunier, 417
U.S. 817, 827–28 (1974).
97 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
98 Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977).
99 See Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1299–1307 (S.D. Tex. 1980), aff ’ d in
part, rev’d in part, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982).
100 See Chase, supra note 91, at 77–79.
101 See supra notes 16–28 and accompanying text.
102 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 524, 558–60 (1979).
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holding that prisoners have no right to communicate with
prisoners at other facilities.103 Turner involved a class action by
prisoners challenging the constitutionality of mail and marriage
regulations in Missouri prisons.104 Justice O’Connor, writing for
the Court, posited, “when a prison regulation impinges on
inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”105 Turner
also developed a four-factor test heavily favoring prison
administrator regulations.106
In the years following, Turner’s low scrutiny rational
basis test has been used to assess the constitutionality of prison
regulations in a number of contexts, severely limiting the rights
of prisoners.107 The wide-ranged deference afforded to prison
administrators under Turner means that courts will rarely, if
ever, look past the allegedly “expert decisions” of prison
administrators to assess the impact of facility policies on

103 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 91–93 (1987). The challenged mail regulation
permitted correspondence “with immediate family members who are inmates in other
correctional institutions,” and also permitted “correspondence between inmates
concerning legal matters.” Id. at 81 (citations omitted). However, the regulation did not
permit correspondence between other inmates unless “the classification/treatment team
of each inmate deemed it in the best interest of the parties involved.” Id. at 82 (citations
omitted). Applying the substantial state interest standard from Martinez, the district
court and Eighth Circuit, under strict scrutiny analysis, held the regulations violated
the class action prisoners’ constitutional rights. Id. at 83.
104 Id. at 81.
105 Id. at 89.
106 See infra text accompanying notes 121–127.
107 See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132, 135–37 (2003) (applying Turner
standard to uphold prison regulations which restrict the visitation rights of inmates with
substance abuse violations while incarcerated); Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 229, 231–
32 (2001) (remanding the question of whether inmates have a special First Amendment
right to provide legal assistance to fellow inmates, to be answered via application of the
Turner standard); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 223, 226–27 (1990) (applying the
Turner standard to determine that when requiring a mentally ill inmate to take
antipsychotic medications, due process does not require a judicial hearing, and thus a
physician’s recommendation that he be on those medications suffices); Thornburgh v.
Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 414, 418–19 (1989) (applying the Turner standard to regulations
allowing prison wardens to reject certain outside publications from being received by
prisoners); O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349–52 (1987) (applying Turner
standard to determine the government’s legitimate penological interest permit regulations
barring Muslim prisoners from attending weekly Jumu’ah services). Additionally, lower
federal courts have extended the Turner standard of review to a number of contexts,
including cruel and unusual punishment and equal protection. See Klinger v. Dep’t of Corr.,
31 F.3d 727, 733–34 (8th Cir. 1994) (applying the Turner standard to equal protection
claims by inmates at Nebraska’s only women’s prison regarding the facility’s conditions);
Salaam v. Collins, 830 F. Supp. 853, 861–64 (D. Md. 1993) (applying the Turner standard
to equal protection claims to uphold regulations preventing Muslim inmates from
practicing dietary restrictions, performing congregate daily prayer services, and
celebrating religious events with outsiders); White v. Morris, 832 F. Supp. 1129, 1136 (S.D.
Ohio 1993) (applying the Turner standard to constitutionality of racial segregation within
prison population).
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prisoners.108 Further, Turner-era increases in prison populations
led to an inundation of prisoner lawsuits in federal courts, giving
courts plenty opportunity to severely limit the rights of
prisoners.109 In more recent years, federal courts have seldom
found that a prison regulation offends the high prison deference
standard requiring examination of the prisoner to public
communication right.110
III.

THE PROPOSED RIGHT OF PRISONER-TO-PUBLIC
COMMUNICATION

An unfettered and unqualified prisoner-to-public
communication right should be recognized in light of the rise of
mass incarceration, resulting conditions, and the hands-off
approach the Supreme Court has taken toward prison
administration.111 The inhumane conditions resulting from
overcrowding—and the highly disproportionate impacts of overincarceration on communities of color—suggest the need to fully
reconsider the nature of prisoner basic human rights. In the age
of mass incarceration, prison industry accountability to the
public and rehabilitation of the incarcerated should be at the
center of this contemporary evaluation of prisoner rights.
One of the most fundamental rights of all citizens, including
prisoners, is First Amendment freedom of speech. Without freedom
of speech, other fundamental human rights are at risk. As the
Supreme Court has repeatedly announced, however, the free
speech of prisoners is necessarily restricted due to the nature of the
prison environment.112 Nevertheless, the proposed right of
108 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979) (“Prison administrators
therefore should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of
policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and
discipline and to maintain institutional security.”). It is important to note that the court
essentially created a presumption of prison administrator expertise with no explanation
as to why this is so, and no directives that lower courts demand any requirements to
ensure the expertise of prison administrators.
109 See supra note 106; see also James E. Robertson, The Rehnquist Court and
the “Turnerization” of Prisoners’ Rights, 10 N.Y.C. L. REV. 97, 102 (2006) (“The facts of
the record mattered little, because a majority of the justices accepted at face value the
defendant’s security concerns and accorded them greater weight than the liberty
interests of persons presumed innocent.”). Additionally, Congress responded to the influx
of prisoner lawsuits by enacting the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act 1996, severely
limiting prisoner access to litigation in federal courts. See discussion infra notes 254–
260.
110 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
111 See supra Part II.
112 See Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 415–19 (allowing prison wardens to restrict
inmate’s access to various publications); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 93 (1987)
(restricting the communication between inmates at different Missouri prisons); Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 826–27 (1974) (restricting the right for press to conduct face-to-
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prisoner-to-public communication would be a strong start to
providing the public with prison accountability and transparency.
A.

Features of the Proposed Right of Prisoner-to-Public
Communication
1. Prison Regulations Involving Prisoner-to-Public
Communication Should Be Subject to the Procunier
v. Martinez Standard of Review

The Supreme Court impliedly established the standard
of review for all outgoing prisoner communication to the public
when it decided Procunier v. Martinez.113 Procunier v. Martinez
was a prisoner class action lawsuit challenging prison mail
censorship rules in California state prisons in the midst of the
prisoner right’s movement.114 The Court’s primary task was
resolving the question of the appropriate standard of review for
prison regulations limiting prisoner communication with the
public.115 The Court held that a prison’s regulations or practices
restricting free citizen’s access to prisoner speech must (1)
“further an important or substantial governmental interest
unrelated to the suppression of expression;” and (2) “must be no
greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the
particular governmental interest involved.”116
Martinez established a right on behalf of free citizens to
access prisoner speech, impliedly granting prisoners a right to
communicate with the public.117 In doing so, the Court
face interviews with inmates, instead saying inmates and press members may conduct
correspondence in writing).
113 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413–14 (1974). Note that the Supreme
Court later limited the holding in Martinez finding the standard of review unsuitable for
regulations that involve speech directed inside the prison. See Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at
409–14. This limit to the Martinez holding by Thornburgh is entirely consistent with this
analysis because the prisoner-to-public communication right proposal only seeks
application of the Martinez standard for outgoing prisoner communication, consistent
with the holding in Thornburgh.
114 Martinez, 416 U.S. at 396, 398. The prison regulations challenged in Martinez
authorized officials to open and read all incoming and outgoing mail, and to censor any
mail considered to “unduly complain” or “magnify grievances” by prisoners. Id. at 399–400.
Additionally, prisoner mail could be withheld if it expressed “inflammatory political, racial,
[or] religious” views or was “lewd, obscene or defamatory.” Id. at 399–400.
115 Id. at 406.
116 Id. at 413. Applying the fairly rigorous Martinez two-step standard of
review, the Court first found that the prison regulations at issue were unnecessarily
broad and that the state failed to show a substantial government interest that the
regulations were necessary to preserve order in the facility or rehabilitate inmates. Id.
at 415–16. As to the second part, the court found the regulations were “not narrowly
drawn to reach only material that might be thought to encourage violence nor is its
application limited to incoming letters.” Id. at 416.
117 Id. at 418.
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recognized the tension between prison administration and the
need to protect prisoner-public communication, finding the
Court’s traditional hands-off approach inappropriate.118 The
Court held that the restrictions unconstitutionally interfered
with the rights of free citizens, who sought to maintain contact
with people housed at the correctional facility.119 Under the
Martinez standard’s second factor, the Court held that the
California regulation which might exclude material that would
“unduly complain” or “magnify grievances” was overbroad.120
Although the Court did not state it explicitly, the
bilateral nature of the Martinez Court’s recognized that any
regulation interfering with prisoner-to-public communication
right must be examined under the Martinez standard.121 By
acknowledging the free citizen right to prisoner communication,
the Court impliedly recognized a right on behalf of prisoners to
reach the public with its communication.122 That is, the public’s
right to prisoner communication cannot exist, or is meaningless,
unless prisoners also have the right to provide speech to the
public.123 As noted by the Court:
Communication by letter is not accomplished by the act of writing
words on paper. Rather, it is effected only when the letter is read by
the addressee. Both parties to the correspondence have an interest in
securing that result, and censorship of the communication between
them necessarily impinges on the interest of each. Whatever the
status of a prisoner’s claim to uncensored correspondence with an
outsider, it is plain that the latter’s interest is grounded in the First
Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech.124

Application of the Martinez standard for prisoner-to-public
communication makes sense given the Court’s repeated
distinction between external and internal communication in its
prisoner free speech cases.125 Intra-prisoner speech is highly
Id. at 404–06.
Id. at 408–09 (“[C]ensorship of prisoner mail works a consequential restriction
on the First and Fourteenth Amendments rights of those who are not prisoners.”).
120 Id. at 415 (Moreover the court explained that the regulation was overbroad
because it “invited prison officials and employees to apply their own personal prejudices
and opinions as standards for prisoner mail censorship,” and were not “necessary to the
furtherance of a governmental interest, unrelated to the suppression of expression.”).
121 Id. at 408.
122 Id. at 408–09.
123 Id. at 408–09.
124 Id. at 408. As noted by the Court for example, “[t]he wife of a prison inmate
who is not permitted to read all that her husband wanted to say to her has suffered an
abridgment of her interest in communicating with him as plain as that which results from
censorship of her letter to him.” Id. at 409.
125 See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 412–13 (1989) (concluding that
prisons officials are afforded broad discretion when regulations relate to incoming
publications, and noting, “[o]nce in the prison, material . . . may be expected to circulate
118
119
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restricted, and prisoners have few rights associated with free
speech within prison walls.126 The Supreme Court naturally
assumes that intra-prison speech is more likely to threaten the
penological interest of correctional facilities than speech aimed
outside the prison walls.127
Consequently, when involving intra-prison speech, the
Supreme Court has applied the more prison-deferential
standard of review articulated in Turner v. Safley.128 Finding the
more rigorous Martinez standard inappropriate for regulations
aimed at intra-prisoner speech,129 the Court held that prison
regulation impinging on inmates’ constitutional rights is valid if
it is “reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.”130
In doing so, the Turner Court announced four factors in
determining whether a reasonable relationship exists between
the prison limitation on free speech and penological interests.131
The first factor involves whether there is a “valid, rational
connection between the prison regulation” and the penological
interest promoted by the government.132 The Court noted that
“the governmental objective must be a legitimate and neutral
one,” that operates “in a neutral fashion, without regard to the
content of the expression.”133 The second factor requires that the
court examine “whether there are alternative means of
exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates.”134 The
third factor requires the court to consider how accommodating
prisoners’ asserted constitutional right will impact “guards and
other inmates” and “allocation of prison resources generally.”135
among prisoners, with the concomitant potential for coordinated disruptive conduct”);
Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 131–32 n.8 (1977) (limiting
prisoners’ right to unionize, including right to receive bulk mailings due to potential
internal security threats); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 826 (1974) (holding that when
the question of media rights involve people entering the prison for face-to-face
communication, “legitimate policy objectives of the corrections system itself, require that
some limitation be placed on such visitations”).
126 Jones, 433 U.S. at 137 (“Prisons, by definition, are closed societies . . . . Of
necessity, rules far different from those imposed on society at large must prevail within
prison walls.” (Burger, C.J., concurring)).
127 See id.
128 See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
129 According to the Turner Court, the more demanding strict scrutiny analysis
“would seriously hamper [prison officials’] ability to anticipate security problems and to
adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison administration.” Id. at 89.
130 Id. at 89. This is known as the “reasonable relationship” test. Id. at 91, 97.
Under the “reasonable relationship test,” a prison practice arguably restricting the free
speech rights of prisoners is valid if it is “reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests.” Id. at 89.
131 Id. at 89–91.
132 Id. at 89–90.
133 Id. at 90.
134 Id.
135 Id.
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Finally, the fourth factor considers whether there are alternative
methods that would accommodate prisoners’ rights at minimal cost
to valid penological interests.136 In examining these four factors, the
Turner Court decided the Missouri regulation at issue, which
barred inmate-to-inmate correspondence, was reasonably related
to the legitimate security interest of the facility.137
As demonstrated in subsequent cases applying the fourfactor Turner standard,138 it is very difficult to overcome the
deference afforded to prison authorities after virtually any
penological interest is proffered by the state.139 Restrictions aimed
at prisoner speech intended for free citizens have fewer such risks
and very little, if any, rational relation to any legitimate nonspeculative penological interest.140 Hence, any restrictions
inhibiting the prisoner-to-public communication right should
receive the protections of the more rigorous Martinez standard.
2. The Prisoner-to-Public Communication Right Must
Be Unfettered
Because politically powerless prisoners are completely
reliant on corrections services for survival, prisoners should
possess an unfettered right to communicate with the public. The
proposed right of prisoner-to-public communication should thus
protect prisoner-to-public communication from prison
administrator review. Since virtually all prisoner outgoing mail
sent from United States federal and state correctional
institutions is subject to review by corrections authorities, this
is both the most essential and controversial feature of the
136 Id. at 90–91 (noting, “the absence of ready alternatives is evidence of the
reasonableness of a prison regulation” and “if an inmate claimant can point to an
alternative that fully accommodates the prisoner’s rights at de minimis cost to valid
penological interests, a court may consider that as evidence that the regulation does not
satisfy the reasonable relationship standard”).
137 Id. at 91.
138 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
139 For example, in the Thornburgh case, the Court found the prison regulation
valid on its face due to the “broad discretion” necessary for prison administrators to
“prevent internal disorder.” Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 428 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Court also noted the regulation’s importance
in responding to several security concerns, including mail between institutions that might
be used to communicate escape plans and to arrange assaults and other violent acts, and a
growing problem with prison gangs. Id. In examining the majority’s security concerns,
Justice Stevens concluded that the concerns noted by the Missouri Division of Corrections
and majority were not supported by the record. Id. at 430.
140 The dissenting justices in Turner concluded that “if the standard can be
satisfied by the low standard of nothing more than a ‘logical connection’ between the
regulation and any legitimate penological concern perceived by a cautious warden . . . it is
virtually meaningless.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 100 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
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proposed right.141 The prisoner-to-public communication right
should be unfettered because review of prisoner mail stifles
prisoner expression. Moreover, there are few penological
purposes for prisons to review prisoner outgoing mail
correspondence and prisoner mail review undermines prison
accountability to the public.142
First, prisoner expression is necessarily restricted when
subjected to prison official review. Stifling prisoner expression,
especially to loved ones and those that provide prisoners a sense
of connection to the outside, runs afoul of prisoner rehabilitation,
and ultimately, public safety when the prisoner returns to
society.143 Even before the contemporary age of mass
incarceration, Justice Marshall emphasized that the unfettered
right to prisoner-public communication is indispensable given the
realities of prison life and the chilling effect of prison
administrators reading prisoner mail:
It seems clear that this freedom may be seriously infringed by
permitting correctional authorities to read all prisoner correspondence.
A prisoner’s free and open expression will surely be restrained by the
knowledge that his every word may be read by his jailors and that his
message could well find its way into a disciplinary file, be the object of
ridicule, or even lead to reprisals. A similar pall may be cast over the
free expression of the inmates’ correspondents.144

Second, there are few legitimate penological purposes for
reading prisoner mail. Marshall’s concurrence in Procunier was
notably suspicious of the penal objectives of prisoner mail review

141 See 28 C.F.R. 540.14 (2018) (the Federal Bureau of Prisons policy on
correspondence notes that “[i]ncoming general correspondence may be read as frequently
as deemed necessary to maintain security or monitor a particular problem confronting
an inmate. . . . Outgoing mail . . . may be read and inspected by staff”); see also FED.
BUREAU OF PRISONS, PROGRAM STATEMENT 5265.14 2 (2011), https://www.bop.gov/policy/
progstat/5265_014.pdf [https://perma.cc/6QNN-SVWK].
142 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 423 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring).
143 Id. at 426. Citing the Second Circuit, Marshall noted in his Martinez concurrence:

Letter writing keeps the inmate in contact with the outside world, helps to hold
in check some of the morbidity and hopelessness produced by prison life and
isolation, stimulates his more natural and human impulses, and otherwise may
make contributions to better mental attitudes and reformation.
and:
The harm censorship does to rehabilitation . . . cannot be gainsaid. Inmates lose
contact with the outside world and become wary of placing intimate thoughts or
criticisms of the prison in letters. This artificial increase of alienation from
society is ill advised.
Id. (quoting Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 199 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc) (alteration in
original) (footnotes omitted)).
144 Id. at 423.
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by officials.145 In support, Justice Marshall made clear that the
State’s asserted penological interest, “that contraband weapons
or narcotics may be smuggled into the prison via the mail,” was
unfounded when concerning prisoner outgoing mail.146 Even in
1974, Marshall noted, inexpensive technology allowed for the xray imaging of the inside of mail for the purpose of detecting
weapons and other improper paraphernalia.147 Such alternative
methods would not have the tendency to restrict content like the
reading of prisoner mail, which might be critical of prison
authorities or conditions.148
Justice Marshall questioned the wisdom of failing to
recognize the unfettered prisoner-public communication right as
a threat to public accountability of a major system within a
democratic society.149 His words are just as true today as they
were in 1974, when he stated:
[T]he mails are one of the few vehicles prisoners have for informing
the community about their existence, and, in these days of strife in
our correctional institutions, the plight of prisoners is a matter of
urgent public concern. To sustain a policy which chills the
communication necessary to inform the public on this issue is at odds
with the most basic tenets of the guarantee of freedom of speech.150

Additionally, when prison problems arise, often the only option
for incarcerated people is to communicate the problem to
someone outside the prison, like a family member or friend.
Given limitations on the media in prisons, difficulties in the
prisoner grievance process, and prisoner litigation obstacles,151
the only means of holding prisons accountable for the treatment
of prisoners and conditions resulting from prison overcrowding,
is often independently drawing attention from the public eye.
Communication of extraordinary prison problems to those on the
outside is rendered ineffective if prison officials are allowed to
freely review, and potentially intercept or otherwise discourage
sending such communication.

Id. at 424–25.
Id. at 424.
147 Id. at 424–25.
148 Id. at 425. Marshall also noted that “the reading of all prisoner mail is too
great an intrusion on First Amendment rights to be justified by such a speculative
concern” as prisoner plotting escape plans. Id.
149 Id. at 427.
150 Id.
151 See discussion infra Sections IV.A and IV.C.
145
146
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3. The Prisoner-to-Public Communication Right Must
Be Unqualified
Prison administration would be in violation of the
“unqualified” right of prisoner-to-public communication if it
punished or otherwise retaliated against prisoners for exercising
their communication right.152 Although the Procunier v.
Martinez majority recognized the right of prisoner-to-public
communication, the importance of the unqualified nature of
prisoner-to-public communication was best emphasized in the
concurring opinion written by Justice Thurgood Marshall.153
Justice Marshall agreed with the majority in striking
down the state of California’s overly broad prisoner-to-public
communication regulation but emphasized the need to reach that
finding under a prisoner’s unqualified right to use the mail.154
When compared to the majority, Justice Marshall did not share
the majority’s view of tension between the prisoner-to-public
communication right and the penological objectives of prisons.155
Justice Marshall instead insisted that “prisoners are . . . entitled
to use the mails as a medium of free expression not as a privilege,
but rather as a constitutionally guaranteed right.”156
Further, Justice Marshall insisted that an unqualified
prisoner-to-public communication right was necessary for prison
accountability to the public.157 The rapid development of mass
incarceration, growing exponentially unbeknownst to the general
public for a number of years, suggests that Justice Marshall was
right. For the proposed right of prisoner-to-public communication
152 Of course, prisoner communication to the public would be subject to the criminal
laws of free citizens such that communication would carry the normal penalties associated
with communication carrying criminal threats or otherwise facilitating criminal activity.
153 Martinez, 416 U.S. at 422 (Marshall, J., concurring).
154 Id. at 422–23.
155 Id. Not only was Justice Marshall particularly protective of prisoner outgoing
mail, he disagreed with the majority’s view that reading prisoner mail might serve as a
useful tool in the rehabilitative process. Id. at 425–26. In this context, Marshall also
questioned whether prisons had come to adopt a rehabilitative model at all. Id. at 425–26.
Assuming that prisons did have a rehabilitative function, Justice Marshall explained the
policy of reading prisoner mail would have a “chilling effect on free expression”, which
would likely inhibit rehabilitative attempts. Id. at 426. Citing the Second Circuit, Justice
Marshall further noted, “the harm censorship does to rehabilitation . . . cannot be gainsaid.
Inmates lose contact with the outside world and become wary of placing inmate thoughts
or criticisms of the prison in letters. This artificial increase of alienation from society is ill
advised.” Id. (quoting Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 199 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc)
(alteration in original) (footnotes omitted)).
156 Id. at 423. Marshall also noted that the appropriate standard that the Court
should have applied required a “substantial government interest and a showing that the
means chosen to effectuate the State’s purpose are not unnecessarily restrictive of
personal freedoms.” Id.
157 Id. at 427.
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to be effective at providing prison accountability to the public, it
must be exercised without the fear of prison official retaliation.
The most recent case visited by the Supreme Court on
prisoner free speech rights, Beard v. Banks, determined that the
four-part Turner test applies to facility regulations that withhold
prisoner First Amendment rights as punishment.158 Banks
involved a Pennsylvania restriction imposed on prisoners in a high
security supermax facility that absolutely banned newspapers,
magazines, and photographs to these prisoners.159 The ban only
allowed “legal and personal correspondence, religious and legal
materials, two library books and writing paper.”160
Applying the Turner test, the court upheld the ban,
noting it must provide “substantial deference to the professional
judgment of prison administrators.”161 The Supreme Court
agreed with the prison official defendants reasoning that the
particularly high-risk inmates had already been deprived of
every other right possible to gain compliance of prison rules, so
depriving them of First Amendment rights was “a significant
behavioral incentive.”162 According to the Court, the free speech
limitation was upheld because “providing increased incentives
for better prison behavior” for “particularly difficult inmates” is
a legitimate penological interest.163
It is hard to know how broadly Banks might apply to
other types of prisoner rights deprivation, such as the proposed
right of prisoner-to-public communication. Justice Stevens
dissented, noting that there seemed to be no limit on the Court’s
finding that it is permissible to take away items that a prisoner
158 See Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 524, 529 (2006) (citing Turner v. Safley,
482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). To justify using prisoner First Amendment rights as punishment,
the Banks court cited to previous precedent, wherein the Court “upheld a prison’s ‘severe’
restriction on the family visitation privileges of prisoners with repeat substance abuse
violations.” Id. at 533 (citing Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 134 (2003)). In doing so,
the Court stated, “withholding such privileges ‘is a proper and even necessary
management technique to induce compliance with the rules of inmate behavior,
especially for high-security prisoners who have few other privileges to lose.’” Id. (quoting
Overton, 539 U.S. at 134). Citing case similarities, the Court stated, despite the
constitutional dimensions of both cases, that both cases required the Court to defer to
the prison administrators’ “experience-based conclusion that the policies help to further
legitimate prison objectives.” Id.
159 Id. at 525–26.
160 Id. at 526.
161 Id. at 528 (quoting Overton, 539 U.S. at 132) (internal quotation marks omitted).
162 Id. at 535. Dismissing Banks’ claim that, “increased contact with the world
generally favors rehabilitation,” the Court decided that although the restriction was
“severe” the plaintiff Banks failed to illustrate that it did not meet a penological
objective. Id. at 534, 536. Hence, the scarcely resourced prisoner has the burden of
showing that the litigated prison regulation fails to meet a reasonable penological
objective. Id. at 534–36.
163 Id. at 530.
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values to promote better behavior, and he feared the ruling could
be used to justify the deprivation of even more fundamental
constitutional rights.164
Regardless, the proposed unqualified right to prisoner-topublic communication would appropriately and explicitly limit
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Banks so that prisoner-to-public
communication rights could not be withheld as punishment. The
prisoner-to-public communication right’s goal of promoting
prison accountability far outweighs any penological gains that
could be realized from withholding the right from prisoners. The
prisoner-to-public communication right would therefore be an
appropriate limitation to the Banks holding, especially considering
the Banks Court did not specifically extend its holding to apply
beyond the rights addressed in that case.
Even when involving prisoners considered high-risk or
dangerous like in Banks, the prisoner-to-public communication
right would provide several penological benefits. For example,
prisoner correspondence exercised under the prisoner-to-public
communication right might enlighten the public about the very
situations that it should be concerned about, such as prison
vulnerabilities that caused the prisoner’s dangerous behavior or
prisoner subjection to unreasonable distress after the prisoner
has exhibited dangerous behavior. Additionally, prisoner exercise
of the prisoner-to-public communication right might prove
therapeutic in addressing the prisoner’s high-risk behavior or
lead to the discovery of an undiagnosed mental illness suffered by
the dangerous prisoner.
Further, granting incarcerated people an unqualified right
to be free from punishment and retaliation when communicating
with the public is consistent with federal court precedent holding
that it is unconstitutional to retaliate against inmates for
writings.165 Moreover, unless prisoner speech interferes with
164 Id. at 546–47 (Stevens, J., dissenting). However, Banks suggests that Turner’s
reasonable relations test might apply to any prisoner first amendment right deprivation
regulations by facilities. Id. at 531–33 (plurality opinion).
165 Simmat v. Manson, 535 F. Supp. 1115, 1117–18 (D. Conn. 1982) (where the
court held that “[t]he plaintiff ’ s First Amendment right to freedom of expression includes
the right to express himself without punitive retaliation”); see also Silva v. Di Vittorio,
658 F.3d 1090, 1104, 1106 (9th Cir. 2011) (prisoner properly stated a retaliation claim
where prison facility transferred him to another correctional facility and confiscated
sixteen boxes of legal files for the purpose of preventing his testimony against the
transferring facility); Meriwether v. Coughlin, 879 F.2d 1037, 1040, 1045 (2d Cir. 1989)
(damage award upheld when jury found that inmates were transferred for exercising
First Amendment right to meet with prison superintendent to complain about prison
conditions); Jackson v. Thurmer, 748 F. Supp. 2d 990, 1000 (W.D. Wis. 2010) (court
acknowledged precedent holding that an individual should not be punished for “‘pure
thought’” (citing Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757, 765 (7th Cir. 2004))).
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rehabilitation or other penological interests, lower courts have
been willing to protect even seemingly negative content on behalf
of prisoners as long as it involves external expression.166
4. Form of Prisoner-to-Public Communication
The form of allowable unqualified prisoner communication
is the most elusive feature of the proposed right. At a minimum,
correctional policies overseeing the proposed right should
guarantee unqualified and unfettered prisoner-to-public
communication through the mail. The Supreme Court has on
various occasions emphasized the importance of the mail in its
prisoner free speech jurisprudence, with Justice Marshall noting,
“‘use of the mails is almost as much a part of free speech as a right
to use our tongues.’”167 Additionally, ceasing correctional facility
mail review practices would either save the prison resources or
allow them to be used in other ways.
The right should encourage prisons to adopt policies on
prisoner-to-public communication that would be in the best
interest of prisoner rehabilitation. Given the availability of
technological advances in the area of communication, the
proposed right should encourage as many means of safe prisonerto-public communication as possible. Prison administration could
also use access to prisoner-to-public communications that go
beyond the mail—like access to messaging, videoconference, and
social media—as privileges and incentives toward meeting
rehabilitative benchmarks.168

166 See Medina v. City of Philadelphia, No. Civ.A.03-1971, 2004 WL 1126007, at
*1, *4 (E.D. Pa. May 19, 2004) (finding that the plaintiff “presented a viable First
Amendment claim against Defendants for confiscation of his manuscripts” where
Plaintiff had been working on a manuscript about the Latin Kings).
167 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 422 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(quoting Milwaukee Soc. Democratic Publ’g Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 437 (1921)
(Holmes, J., dissenting)).
168 Telecommunication companies such as American Prison Data Systems, Edovo
and JPay are beginning to develop software and other technology that attempts to close the
digital divide between prisoners and the public when accessing such forums. These
companies claim that “offering educational and entertainment content . . . can help
improve prisoner behavior and reduce the chances of recidivism” on release. See Dan
Tynan, Online Behind Bars: If Internet Access Is a Human Right, Should Prisoners Have
It?, GUARDIAN (Oct. 3, 2016, 6:00 EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/oct/03/
prison-internet-access-tablets-edovo-jpay [https://perma.cc/A6SP-4UY9]; see also Aysha
Kerr & Matthew Willis, Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice: Prisoner Use of
Information and Communications Technology, AUSTRALIAN INST. OF CRIMINOLOGY 1–2, 14
(Oct. 2018), https://aic.gov.au/publications/tandi/tandi560 [https://perma.cc/3Y2C-VZ9Z].
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Limitations on the Proposed Right of Prisoner-to-Public
Communication
1. No Public-to-Prisoner Communication

As noted above, restrictions that place limitations on most
prisoner outgoing speech are subject to the more rigorous Martinez
standard.169 When the prisoner communication is directed inside
prisons, however, the unqualified and unfettered right of prisonerto-public communication would not apply. In other words, the right
would only extend to prisoner communication directed to the
public, but not public communication directed at prisoners, nor
would it include prisoner communication to other prisoners.
In Thornburgh v. Abbott, prisoners filed a class action
challenging Federal Bureau of Prisons censorship rules that
permitted the warden to reject publications “detrimental to the
security, good order, or discipline of the institution . . . [that]
might facilitate criminal activity.”170 The Bureau also enforced an
“all-or-nothing” practice that kept class action inmates from
reviewing acceptable portions of publications if any part was
deemed to violate the Bureau restriction.171 Applying the more
restrictive Martinez standard, the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia remanded the case “for an
individualized determination of the constitutionality of the [fortysix] exclusions” at issue.172
The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that the court of
appeals was in error in that the less restrictive Turner standard, not
Martinez, applied despite the provisions involving the free speech
rights of non-inmate free citizens.173 Justice Blackmun writing for
the 6-3 majority reasoned that the more restrictive Martinez
standard did not apply to the regulations in question because
Martinez involved prisoner “outgoing correspondence” and the
present question in Thornburgh involved third party publications
entering prison facilities.174 Then, applying Turner’s reasonable
See supra Section III.A.1.
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 404–05 (1989) (quoting 28 C.F.R.
§ 540.71(b) (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
171 Id. at 406–07 n.8.
172 Id. at 404.
173 Id. at 413–14.
174 Id. at 413. Moreover, the Court explained that potentially dangerous
outgoing communication is more likely to fall within “readily identifiable categories”
such as “escape plans, plans relating to ongoing criminal activity, and threats of
blackmail or extortion.” Id. at 412. As a result, the Court limited the Martinez’ holding
to regulations concerning outgoing correspondence, stating “[t]he implications if
outgoing correspondence for prison security are of a categorically lesser magnitude than
the implications of incoming materials.” Id. at 413.
169
170
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relationship standard and four-factor test, the Thornburgh Court
upheld the Federal Bureau of Prison’s regulation.175
After Thornburgh, even restrictions on prisoner speech not
intended for other prisoners will be viewed under the less restrictive
Turner standard if the prison defendant can illustrate that the
prisoner’s speech has negative consequences to the internal function
and safety of the facility.176 Since the Court has explicitly denied
prisoner right to access to external communications from the public,
the prisoner-to-public communication right is increasingly
important to prisoner rehabilitation and public safety.
2. No Prisoner-to-Public Communication for the
Purpose of Forming Unions
Similarly, the Supreme Court’s limitation on prisoner
ability to organize and form labor unions illustrates the
importance of the proposed prisoner-to-public communication
right. In Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, the
Supreme Court held that prison restrictions on prisoner ability
to organize within the prison walls, and potentially associate
with prison unions on the outside, were constitutional.177 By
1975 toward the end of the prisoner rights movement, the
175 Id. at 419. In looking at the first of the Turner factors, the Court was tasked
with determining whether the governmental objective underlying the restriction is
rationally related to a legitimate penological objective and is content neutral. Id. at 414.
Noting that the content neutral question was a close one, the Court rejected the
plaintiff ’ s argument that the Bureau restrictions placed limitations on content since the
warden was specifically authorized to reject publications from a non-exhaustive list of
criteria that included sexually explicit publications such as homosexual publications
(intended for the same sex as the institution population). Id. at 415–16. The Court found
that as long as the distinctions between publications are based “solely on the basis of
their potential implications for prison security,” prison officials should be given high
deference in maintaining the security of its facilities. Id. at 415. Further, the Court
agreed with the Government that even if materials weren’t “likely” to lead to a prison
security risk, it is acceptable for a warden to exclude materials that would “create an
intolerable risk of disorder under the conditions of a particular prison at a particular
time.” Id. at 417. In applying the second “alternative means” factor, the Court found that
the Bureau regulations permitted a number of publications to be received by prisoners,
and also, that the prisoners had alternative means of communicating. Id. at 418. As to
the third “impact and allocation” factor, the Court found that “the right in question [to
receive specific publications] ‘can be exercised only at the cost of significantly less liberty
and safety for everyone else, guards and other prisoners alike,’” and in such cases the
courts should defer to the “‘informed discretion of corrections officials.’” Id. (quoting
Turner, 482 U.S. at 90). Finally, in resolving the fourth “alternative methods” factor, the
Court determined that there were no obvious alternatives that would guard against the
danger to which the regulations were aimed, and therefore, the Bureau’s rule was “not
an ‘exaggerated response.’” Id.
176 An example of where a lower court has decided that the outward writings
of inmates were inappropriate is Frink v. Arnold, 842 F. Supp. 1184, 1186–87, 1192
(S.D. Iowa 1994).
177 Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 125–26, 136 (1977).
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Prisoners Labor Union had two thousand prison “inmate
members in 40 different prisons in the State of North
Carolina.”178 The State, “unhappy with these developments”
proscribed regulations that forbade “inmates from soliciting
other inmates to join [the Union], barred all meetings of the
Union, and refused delivery of packets of Union publications
mailed in bulk to several inmates for redistribution among other
prisoners.”179 Although the regulations did not outright prohibit
union membership, solicitation and any union activity of any
kind was not permitted.180 Union prisoner plaintiffs filed suit to
challenge the restrictions.181
In 1977, the Supreme Court heard the case.182 According
to the Court, the appropriate standard when evaluating prisoner
association rights is to consider whether the regulations are
“rationally related to the reasonable . . . objectives of prison
administration,” as established in Pell v. Procunier.183 Under the
Pell rational relationship standard, the Court decided that there
is no prisoner right to associate with prison labor union
organizations and that the North Carolina regulations
constructively preventing Union membership did not offend the
First and Fourteenth Amendments.184
Despite this limitation, Jones affirms the importance of
prisoner access to public communication as expressed in
Martinez and Pell.185 Although the Court reasoned that the
formation of the prisoners’ union “pos[ed] the likelihood of
disruption to prison order or stability,” the reasoning to uphold
the restrictions rested in part on the availability of
communication alternatives and the fact that the Union’s
“speech” was directed inside of the correctional facilities.186 In
banning the Union solicitation or organization, the Court
reasoned the prison had merely “affected one of several ways in
which inmates may voice their complaints to, and seek relief
from prison officials.”187 Additionally, the Jones Court
Id. at 122.
Id. at 121–22.
180 Id. at 122.
181 Id. at 122–23. The district court concluded that it was “‘unable to perceive why
it [was] necessary or essential to security and order in the prisons to forbid solicitation of
membership in a union permitted by the authorities’” and resolved the case on behalf of
the Union. Id. at 123–24.
182 Id. at 119.
183 Id. at 129; see also Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974).
184 Jones, 433 U.S. 119 at 136.
185 Id. at 130–33.
186 Id. at 130–33.
187 Id. at 130 n.6. In dissent, Justice Marshall noted that the court had taken
“a giant step backwards” in recognizing prisoner rights and reemphasized the need of
178
179
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proclaimed that the prohibition of bulk mailing did not run afoul
to prisoner First Amendment rights “since other avenues of
outside informational flow by the Union” remained available.188
Nevertheless, the implications of this ruling are clear—
prisoners have no right to organize with other prisoners or outside
advocacy organizations if such activity could be viewed as a threat
to facility internal security. The fact that prisoners have no right
to organize unions makes the right to prisoner-to-public
communication even more important to the millions incarcerated
across the United States.
IV.

RATIONALES SUPPORTING THE RIGHT OF PRISONER-TOPUBLIC COMMUNICATION

Recognizing the right to unqualified and unfettered
prisoner-to-public communication is a necessary step in
permanently reducing prison populations. There are several
reasons this proposed right is important to transformative justice
reform, such as the incentives of public accountability, prisoner
rehabilitation, and public safety.
A.

Prison Accountability to the Public

Despite use of enormous state and federal resources and
taxpayer dollars spent each year on corrections,189 the public
knows little about the conditions or effectiveness of the
corrections system.190 This is primarily because prisons are not
strict scrutiny analysis as the appropriate level of scrutiny for evaluating regulations
that restrict prisoner freedom of speech and expression. Id. at 139–40 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Further Marshall warned, putting the free speech rights of prisoners in the
hands of prison personnel, would inevitably “err on the side of too little freedom,”
especially since prison and public criticism could potentially cost a warden or other
prison officials a job. Id. at 142.
188 Id. at 130–31.
189 In a report by the Prison Policy Initiative, it is estimated that “the system
of mass incarceration costs the government and families of justice-involved people at
least $182 billion every year.” Peter Wagner & Bernadette Rabuy, Following the Money
of Mass Incarceration, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.prison
policy.org/reports/money.html [https://perma.cc/PDF6-WTQM]. “The [prison] industry is
dominated by two large publicly traded companies—CoreCivic ([formerly known as]
Corrections Corporation of America (CCA)) and The GEO Group—as well as one small
private company, Management & Training Corp (MTC).” Id. The report estimates that
these companies “received $3.9 billion in revenue from mass incarceration and
immigration detention” in 2015, “and made [$374 million] in profits” for the 2015 fiscal
year. Id. There is also plenty of profit generated in the system of mass incarceration in
other industries such as bail bond companies, specialized phone services, and
commissary vendors. See id.
190 See John Immerwahr & Jean Johnson, The Revolving Door: Exploring
Public Attitudes Toward Prisoner Reentry 2 (Working Discussion Paper for the Urb.
Inst.’s Reentry Roundtable, Mar. 2002), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/
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subject to the same media scrutiny as other public institutions.
In 1974, the Supreme Court decided Pell v. Procunier, a case
involving First Amendment media access claims by a number of
prisoners and journalists.191 Under the challenged regulation,
media were denied requests to interview specific prisoners faceto-face and prisoners were also disallowed from initiating media
interviews.192 Despite the fact that prisons are responsible for
the ongoing care and safety of human beings, the Pell Court
ruled that prison restrictions on media access to prisons and
prisoners are constitutional as long as they are imposed in a
content neutral manner.193
The Pell decision essentially deprived prisoners and the
public of prison accountability through the media. Though the Court
acknowledged “[t]he constitutional guarantee of a free press ‘assures
the maintenance of our political system and an open society,’” it
refused to grant media a right of access to prisons beyond that of any
other citizen, which is typically highly restricted.194 The Supreme
Court has made clear in other cases that the media does not receive
more protection than any other individual when speech is directed
into a prison or deals with access to a prison or prisoner.195 In
upholding regulations that disallowed face-to-face prisoner
interviews by media, the Court emphasized the fact that alternative

publication/60766/410804-The-Revolving-Door.PDF [https://perma.cc/5LY4-KW64]
(noting that despite a wealth of criminally oriented television shows, the public knows
very little about prison life or prisoner re-entry).
191 Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 819–20 (1974). The prisoner and journalist
plaintiffs challenged a regulation that limited prisoner visitors “to individuals who have
either a personal or professional relationship to the inmate—family, friends of prior
acquaintance, legal counsel, and clergy.” Id. at 827. The state’s penological purpose of
this policy was purportedly to “permit inmates to have personal contact with those
persons who will aid in their rehabilitation, while keeping visitations at a manageable
level that will not compromise institutional security.” Id. Like in Martinez, the Court
acknowledged that prisoners “retain[ ] those First Amendment rights that are not
inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of
the corrections system.” Id. at 822.
192 Id. at 819.
193 Id. at 827–28. The Court however took note that “under some circumstances
the right of free speech includes a right to communicate a person’s views to any willing
listener, including a willing representative of the press for the purpose of publication by a
willing publisher.” Id. at 822.
194 Id. at 832. (quoting Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967)). Although
media plaintiffs argued the regulation requiring face-to-face interviews with specific
inmates constituted “governmental interference with their newsgathering activities,” the
Court declared that “[n]ewsmen have no constitutional right of access to prisons or their
inmates beyond that afforded the general public.” Id. at 833–34. In failing to recognize a
media right of access, the Pell majority declared that media only enjoy a privilege to prison
and prisoners versus a right to access. Id. at 834.
195 See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 9 (1978); Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co.,
417 U.S. 843, 856–57, 875 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting) (like Pell, Saxbe dealt with press
requests to interview specific named inmates, but in federal prisons).

2018]

PRISONER-TO-PUBLIC COMMUNICATION

149

mechanisms for communication with the media were provided.196
Unfortunately, the alternative form of communication suggested by
the Court in Pell was mail communication, which is subject to review
by prison officials.197
In light of deference to prison regulations that restrict
media access to prisons, the importance of recognizing an
unqualified and unfettered prisoner-to-public communication
right cannot be overemphasized.198 In a very critical dissenting
opinion, Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Marshall and
Brennan, explained the press’s very important role in the
function of a democratic society, emphasizing the special
importance of this role in the prison setting.199 As also noted by
the dissent in Pell, “[t]he average citizen is most unlikely to
inform himself about the operation of the prison system. . . . He
is likely instead, in a society which values a free press, to rely
upon the media for information.”200
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the
importance of prisoner free speech to the issue of public
accountability.201 Justice Thurgood Marshall especially understood
196 See Saxbe 417 U.S. at 824–26 (majority opinion). The Court also suggested
that the prisoner’s “unrestricted opportunity to communicate with the press or any other
member of the public through their families, friends, clergy, or attorneys who are permitted
to visit them at the prison,” was an additional means of communicating with the media.
Pell, 417 U.S. at 825. The dissenting Justices were unimpressed by the alternative form of
communication available between media and prisoners, stating, “‘[t]his reason for
abridgment strikes me as being on a par with holding that governmental suppression of a
newspaper in a city would not violate the First Amendment because there continue to be
radio and television stations.’” Id. at 838 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing NLRB v. Fruit
Packers, 377 U.S. 58, 79–80 (Black, J., concurring)).
197 See supra note 141.
198 Additionally, following the San Quentin and related riots, prisons “had ceased
to capture the public attention as it had a few years earlier . . . [m]ainstream newspapers
generally no longer had beat reporters for prison issues, and undercover journalists no
longer got jobs in prisons to report on conditions inside.” Berger, supra note 81, at 225.
199 Pell, 417 U.S. at 837–41 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas noted:

Crime, like the economy, health, education, defense, and the like, is a matter
of grave concern in our society and people have the right and the necessity to
know not only of the incidence of crime but of the effectiveness of the system
designed to control it. “On any given day, approximately 1,500,000 people are
under the authority of [federal, state and local prison] systems. The cost to
taxpayers is over one billion dollars annually. Of those individuals sentenced
to prison, 98% will return to society.” The public’s interest in being informed
about prisons is thus paramount.
Id. at 840 (footnotes omitted).
200 Id. at 841. The dissent additionally insisted that the only issue appropriately
before the court was whether the complete ban on interviews with inmates selected by
the press went beyond what was necessary for the protection of the governmental
interest. Id. at 840.
201 See Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 130 (1977)
(stating that the regulation limiting prisoner organizing as a union organizing was not
unconstitutional in part because “First Amendment speech rights were” barely
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the plight of prisoners and the need to maintain contact with the
outside world202 from his previous experience working as an
attorney for the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund
representing the rights of black criminal defendants in a pre-civil
rights era. In his concurring opinion in Martinez, Justice Marshall
made an unprecedentedly strong case in favor of the right to
unfettered prisoner-to-public communication by mail well before
mass incarceration as we know it today.203 Justice Marshall urged
that the need for an unfettered prisoner right to use the mail is
essential to prison accountability and prisoner fair treatment.204
B.

Prisoner Rehabilitation and Public Safety

The prisoner perspective is important to providing dignity to
prisoners, which is necessary in meeting prison rehabilitative goals
and reducing prison populations. The meaning of being a prisoner is
highly censored by correctional facility authorities, and, as a result,
disregarded by the public. This disassociation from prisoners and
society creates a dehumanizing effect and the true stories of
incarcerated people, their daily lives, and family dynamics are
missing from the daily lives of those on the outside. Silencing an
inmate’s expression does not further a prison’s rehabilitative goals,
and in fact, likely hinders them.205 As noted by Justice Thurgood
Marshall’s concurring opinion in Procunier v. Martinez:
When the prison gates slam behind an inmate, he does not lose his
human quality; his mind does not become closed to ideas; his intellect
does not cease to feed on a free and open interchange of opinions; his
yearning for self-respect does not end; nor is his quest for selfrealization concluded. If anything, the needs for identity and selfrespect are more compelling in the dehumanizing prison
environment. . . . [A] prisoner needs a medium for self-expression.206

implicated”); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 418 (1974) (“The interests of prisoners
and their correspondents in uncensored communication by letter, grounded as it is in the
First Amendment, is plainly a ‘liberty’ interest within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment even though qualified of necessity by the circumstance of imprisonment.”);
Pell, 417 U.S. at 824 (quoting the same language in Martinez and holding that because
prisoners were allowed mail communication as an alternative means to media face-toface interviews, this was sufficient).
202 Martinez, 416 U.S. at 423–28 (Marshall, J., concurring).
203 Id.
204 Id. at 427.
205 Titia A. Holtz, Note, Reaching Out from Behind Bars: The Constitutionality
of Laws Barring Prisoners from the Internet, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 855, 857 (2002)
(Prisoners have the capacity to progress or degenerate in response to their environment
and “it is undeniable that since approximately ninety percent of all inmates will one day
be released, allowing prisoners to communicate with the outside world has important
consequences.” (footnote omitted)).
206 Martinez, 416 U.S. at 428.
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Additionally, once a person is convicted of a crime and
incarcerated, he or she is under the care of the corrections
system until the end of the prison term.207 Although some
monetary assistance from prisoner families is possible through
commissary accounts,208 the corrections institution must meet all
prisoner basic needs. Because prisoners’ complete dependence
on correctional facilities is inevitable, it is important to hold
corrections to several layers of institutional accountability,
including to the public.209 Prisoner communication with the
public is especially important, because without it, other serious
human rights violations could occur at the hands of prison
officials. Courts and corrections institutions should be especially
reluctant to erode prisoner free speech rights in light of the
suppressive impact on a disadvantaged demographical group
and communities of color.210
Given the broad range of potential prison objectives—
including deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, retribution,
and restitution—prisoners should be provided ample opportunity
to inform the public of the prison’s success at meeting these
objectives.211 Moreover, rehabilitation is not solely on behalf of the
prisoner; it is also vital to public safety.212 Nevertheless, the
justice system does not regulate prisons for effectiveness in
rehabilitation, and in fact, several prison system regulatory
difficulties make effective prisoner rehabilitation unlikely.
207 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (“An inmate must rely on prison
authorities to treat his medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will
not be met.”).
208 28 C.F.R. §§ 506.1–506.2 (2018).
209 See Note, “Mastering” Intervention in Prisons, 88 YALE L.J. 1062, 1067
(1979) (“The larger political community provides prison officials with little incentive to
take the risks inherent in changing the current structure. Individual citizens rarely have
a stake in prison conditions, so prison officials often have no external constituency to
demand accountability or provide political support. Administrators are often evaluated
by their superiors in terms of their success in maintaining low-visibility and low-cost
prison conditions. Because public officials are often unwilling to allocate funds necessary
to provide adequate resources, existing problems are intensified by shortages of staff,
space, and other resources.” (footnotes omitted)).
210 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
211 See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822–23 (1974) (“An important function of
the corrections system is the deterrence of crime . . . his isolation, of course, also serves a
protective function by quarantining criminal offenders for a given period of time while, it
is hoped, the rehabilitative processes of the corrections system work to correct the offender’s
demonstrated criminal proclivity . . . . [S]ince most offenders will eventually return to
society, another paramount objective of the corrections system is the rehabilitation of those
committed to its custody.”).
212 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 7, at 150 (“[T]he formerly incarcerated
may be more involved in crime after prison because incarceration has damaged them
psychologically in ways that make them more rather than less crime prone . . . has exposed
them to violent or other risky contexts, or has placed them at risk of crime because of
imprisonment’s negative social effects on earnings and family life.”).
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Difficulties Regulating Prisons

The right of prisoner-to-public communication is needed
because the ways in which the prison industry is regulated make
it difficult to confront mass incarceration and ensure prisoner
basic rights are met. In addition to the way prisons are
regulated, other features of the U.S. prison system make reform
that would reduce prison populations difficult, including but not
limited to, the profitability of the prison industry,213 public
opinion and implicit biases about criminal behavior and penal
punishment,214 and the lack of national statistics and data on
prison populations.215 Each of these realities presents a seemingly
insurmountable hurdle on its own, unmanageable within the
scope of this article. Nevertheless, understanding the way prisons
are generally regulated deserves specific attention in examining
the need for a right of prisoner-to-public communication.
Certainly, if prisons were adequately regulated through some
means or processes other than the courts, the right of prisonerto-public communication might be less necessary.
Some of the difficulty in regulating prisons exists because
most prisons are run at the state level with facilities locally
maintained under policies and practices that vary from state to
state and from facility to facility.216 Also, there is no uniform set
See Wagner & Rabuy, supra note 189.
The complicated historical underpinnings and relationship between slavery
and modern corrections has heavily influenced criminal justice philosophy and the need
to lock people up to feel safe. Like slavery, American criminal justice philosophy is driven
largely by punishment and authority, and a number of parallels can be drawn between
slavery and the modern mass incarceration justice system. Because of these very
similarities and historical underpinnings, pro-prison policy has failed the public by most
measures of institutional success, and further disadvantaged black communities. A
report by The Sentencing Project notes, “[a] complex set of factors contributes to the
severity and selectivity of punishment in the United States, including public concern
about crime and racial differences in crime rates.” NAZGOL GHANDNOOSH, THE
SENTENCING PROJECT RACE & PUNISHMENT: RACIAL PERCEPTIONS OF CRIME AND
SUPPORT FOR PUNITIVE POLICIES, 3 (2014). The report concludes that “[w]hite Americans
are more punitive than people of color,” that “[m]edia crime coverage fuels racial
perceptions of crime,” and that the actions and statements of policymakers also “amplify
the public’s racial associations of crime.” Id. See generally MUHAMMAD, supra note 32.
215 While the Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics reports data on
the size of the U.S. prison population, the lack of data on many important measurable
factors in prisons remains a significant obstacle to justice reform. See BUREAU OF JUST.
STATS., https://www.bjs.gov/ [https://perma.cc/ZPY4-U93K]. As noted by the National
Research Council, “[n]o mandatory reporting requirement exists for most key indicators or
measures, and many prison systems do not systematically assess or report them . . . there
is little or no standardization of this process . . . little or no quality control over the data;
and no outside, independent oversight.” NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 7, at 165.
216 The only authority held by the federal government in regulating states prisons
is under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Person Act. See Civil Rights of
Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat. 349 (1980) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (2012)); see also infra Section IV.C.5.
213
214
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of standards by which state prisons operate. The United States
Code of Federal Regulations only scarcely addresses prison
administration in federal prisons, deferring largely to the
warden at any given facility on the majority of issues related to
prisoner and institutional management.217 Hence, in both federal
and state prison systems, prison administrators at each facility
largely determine policies and standards.
Prison regulation is otherwise accomplished by a number of
uncoordinated, unrelated, and fragmented systems and processes
that do not address the problems of prison administration in a
cohesive or exhaustive manner. The primary means of prison
regulation include accreditation, prisoner grievances, prisoner
litigation, state oversight, and investigations by the U.S.
Department of Justice.
1. Prison Accreditation
Prison accreditation is ineffective at confronting the
problem of prison overuse and prison conditions for a number of
reasons. First, the entity that issues correctional accreditations,
the American Correctional Association (ACA), uses self-imposed
accreditation standards with no government input.218 All
functions of the ACA are privatized, and there are no federal
reporting requirements for the ACA.219 Typically, local

217 See generally 28 C.F.R. §§ 500–599 (regulating prison management and
administration). For example 28 C.F.R. § 544.21, which regulates postsecondary
education programs for inmates, notes that “[t]he Warden or designee must appoint a
postsecondary education coordinator (ordinarily an education staff member) for
the institution” and that “[t]he postsecondary education coordinator is responsible for
coordinating the institution’s postsecondary education program” but does not specify
what postsecondary education programs prisons must make available, nor sets any
standards for the effectiveness of such programs).
218 The private nonprofit organization is the entity providing accreditation to
prisons, jails and other detention facilities. The members are mostly current and former
corrections officials. According to the company’s website, it publishes “operational
standards designed to enhance correctional practices for the benefit inmates, staff,
administrators, and the public.” Standards Information—ACA Standards, AM. CORR.
ASS’N https://www.aca.org/aca_prod_imis/aca_member/ACA_Member/Standards_and_
Accreditation/StandardsInfo_Home.aspx [https://perma.cc/7P6P-X3XQ]. The ACA’s
accreditation standards address both adult and juvenile facilities. See id. These selfpromulgated standards are divided into mandatory and non-mandatory standards. See
id. In order for a prison facility to receive accreditation, it must meet all mandatory
standards and ninety percent of non-mandatory standards. Id. The ACA’s website
admits, “[d]ue to differences in mission, physical plant, and jurisdictional intricacies, not
all standards may apply to a given facility.” Id.
219 Nevertheless, local departments of correction often base statutory standards
on ACA standards. For example, standards prescribed by Tennessee Corrections Institute
state, “[n]otwithstanding subsection (a), the standards for the square footage of singleoccupancy or multi-occupancy cells in both new and existing local correctional facilities in
this state shall be the minimum standards required by the American Correctional
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governments acquire and build correctional facilities as needed,
and the federal government does not require accreditation by the
ACA for any correctional facility to operate.220
Second, the ACA does not regularly interact with any
prison environment. Once a facility is accredited, the ACA does
not provide oversight or ongoing monitoring of correctional
facilities outside of the reaccreditation process.221 The ACA is
also not responsible for enforcement of its standards and
overseeing whether facilities are consistently following the ACA
standards.222 Facilities have been documented to write policies
and procedures consistent with the ACA standards just prior to
accreditation visitation and audit. Because the audits are
announced months in advance, agencies tend to relax adherence
to standards between accreditation audits.223 In fact, the value
of the ACA accreditation standards is also questionable because
ACA-accredited facilities are not necessarily any more effective
than non-accredited facilities in terms of safety and violence,
especially at the hands of prison staff.224

Association’s Performance-Based Standards for Adult Local Detention Facilities, as
amended by the 2008 Standards Supplement.” TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-4-140(f) (2010).
220 Id. § 41-4-140(a)(1).
221 The process for initial accreditation lasts twelve to eighteen months and
consists of “a series of reviews, evaluations, audits and hearings.” Standards FAQ, AM.
CORR. ASS’N http://www.aca.org/ACA_Prod_IMIS/ACA_Member/Standards___Accreditation/
About_Us/FAQs/ACA_Member/Standards_and_Accreditation/Standards__FAQ.aspx?hkey=
b1dbaa4b-91ef-4922-8e7d-281f012963ce [https://perma.cc/UPR3-Q7WX]. During the
accreditation process, “[t]eams of auditors, referred to as Visiting Committees, are formed
to conduct compliance audits of agencies seeking accreditation and reaccreditation.” AM.
CORR. ASS’N, MANUAL OF ACCREDITATION POLICY AND PROCEDURE 10 (2017), http://
www.aca.org/ACA_Prod_IMIS/docs/standards%20and%20accreditation/ALM-1-3_15_17-F
inal.pdf [https://perma.cc/JZ4A-N262]. After receiving initial accreditation, facilities must
seek reaccreditation every three years. Id. at 9.
222 As a side note, the Supreme Court has ruled that ACA standards do not
create any enforceable rights on behalf of prisoners nor set minimum standards for
prisons. As noted by Court in Bell v. Wolfish, while the recommendations or standards
of organizations like the ACA may be instructive, they “do not establish the
constitutional minima.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 543–44 n.27 (1979). Instead, the
Court noted, the standards merely “establish goals recommended by the organization.”
Id. Additionally, ACA standards have been criticized that the standards are not on par
with “federal case law and that the standards need documented rationale.” David R.
Ralphs, Evaluating American Correctional Association Accreditation of Adult
Correctional Institutions 35 (May 2006) (unpublished M.A. dissertation, The University
of Texas at Arlington) http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.
627.7043&rep=rep1&type=pdf [https://perma.cc/56HM-87QN].
223 George Wagner, Accreditation: The Pathway to Excellence, CORRECTIONS
TODAY, Oct. 1999, at 26.
224 A 2006 study on the effectiveness of accreditation revealed that
ACA accredited facilities were often more crowded than non-accredited
facilities . . . the level of violence was often higher at accredited facilities
compared to non-accredited facilities. The illness-related death rates of
inmates was higher at ACA accredited facilities than it was at non-accredited
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Additionally, loss of accreditation status is rare despite
pervasive negative systemic findings in adult prisons accredited
by the ACA.225 This is because the ACA accreditation process
primarily examines whether the facility seeking accreditation
has adopted standards as recommended by the ACA, rather than
whether the facility is regularly in compliance with such
standards.226 The ACA also receives criticism because there has
been “no objective validation” of ACA standards.227 The question
of the ACA’s role in prison safety is also dubious because the
organization financially benefits from prison growth.228
Similarly, the National Commission on Correctional
Health Care (NCCHC) provides facility accreditations related to
health services and mental health.229 Like the ACA, the NCCHC
sets its own standards, offers a voluntary accreditation program,
and correctional facilities do not require accreditation from the
NCCHC to operate. Additionally, at least one court has found
that healthcare services provided by correctional facilities are
unconstitutional despite NCCHC accreditation.230
2. Prisoner Grievances
Most states statutorily require that its department of
corrections set prisoner grievance procedures for facilities
operating within that system.231 Nevertheless, the prisoner
facilities, however rates of deaths caused by other inmates was lower in ACA
accredited facilities compared to non-accredited facilities.
Ralphs, supra note 222, at 74.
225 For example, several months following “a ‘glowing’ review in a routine
inspection” by the ACA, several “officers were indicted in federal court on charges of
[inmate abuse].” See Dave Boucher, Conflict of Interest Questions Arise in TN Prison
Audit, TENNESSEAN (Sept. 21, 2015, 3:23 PM, CT) https://www.tennessean.com/story/
news/politics/2015/09/21/conflict-of-interest-questions-arise-in-tn-prison-audit/72570304/
[https://perma.cc/3NM9-BX6E].
226 Standards Information—ACA Standards, supra note 218.
227 Ralphs, supra note 222.
228 The ACA charges a large fee for its accreditation services, it has obvious financial
incentives for providing accreditation to detention facilities. See Ralphs, supra note 222, at 17.
229 When Correctional Health Administrators Need Assistance, They Turn to
NCCHC, NAT’L COMM’N ON CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE, https://www.ncchc.org/accredit
ation-facility-services [https://perma.cc/456P-UDPM].
230 See Graves v. Arpaio, 48 F. Supp. 3d 1318, 1338 (D. Ariz. 2014) (“Compliance
with NCCHC standards is not equivalent to complying with constitutional standards.
Nationally recognized best practices may exceed constitutional standards in some areas
and fall short in others.”).
231 However, there is no uniformity amongst states in grievance procedures and
a prisoner’s grievance rights largely rest on what state and facility the prisoner just so
happens to wind up in. PRIYAH KAUL ET AL., MICH. L. PRISON INFO. PROJECT, PRISON
AND JAIL GRIEVANCE POLICIES: LESSONS FROM A FIFTY-STATE SURVEY 1 (2015)
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/policyclearinghouse/Site%20Documents/FOIAReport
10.18.15.2.pdf [https://perma.cc/8C2X-EH6R].
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grievance process is an ineffective way of addressing the
problems experienced by prisoners due to the many pitfalls
embedded within typical prisoner grievance policies.
First, the complexity of prison grievance policies makes
prisoner grievances ineffective at attacking prison problems and
the deeply systemic issues that perpetuate mass incarceration.
Many policies impose complicated and burdensome procedural
requirements that may, in effect, bar prisoners from seeking
redress for legitimate grievances.232 For example, many policies
“require that the prisoner submit grievance forms to a specified
staff member,” while other policies expect prisoners themselves
to determine which staff member has authority to address
grievances.233 The various grievance procedures set by
correctional facilities can be especially challenging for prisoners
that have educational or mental health deficits.
Second, the potential of retaliation by prison personnel
following a prisoner grievance makes prisoners unlikely to
report many problems they experience in prisons. For most
jurisdictions, including the Federal Bureau of Prisons,
“grievance procedures begin with a requirement that the
prisoner seek ‘informal resolution.’”234 Informal resolution
“require[s] prisoners to attempt to resolve the grievance by
requesting a conversation with staff.”235 Informal resolution
requirements in the grievance process raise retaliation concerns,
however, because if a prisoner’s grievance is staff-related, and
the staff member becomes aware of allegations against them,
they may retaliate toward the prisoner with the grievance.236
Especially if the prisoner does not receive a legal remedy, this
232 For example, the first task of the prisoner is to figure out whether the
grievance is redressable under the prison’s grievance policy or not. Id. at 5. Several
jurisdictions do not define what is and what is not grievable, and “where jurisdictions do
offer definitions of grievable and non-grievable matters, those definitions vary greatly.”
Id. (emphasis in original). Additionally, “[t]he vast majority of states require prisoners
to fill out specified forms in order to successfully claim their grievances.” Id. at 12. While
some “prisons have all forms readily available for prisoners in areas like the library or
cafeteria . . . other prisons require that the prisoner request each form they might need
from various staff members.” Id. Moreover,

[g]rievance policies may [even] require prisoners to use a particular type of
paper or include specific information in the complaint. . . . West Virginia
requires that the “inmate may only attach one 8.5 x 11 inch page with writing
on a single side. Only one staple may be used to affix the pages together. The
inmate may not tear, fold, or affix tape to the forms, except that the forms may
be folded and placed into a number 10 envelope.”
Id. at 13.
233
234
235
236

Id. at 12.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id.
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raises concerns given that such prison staff members work in the
aggrieved prisoner’s living environment and is at least in part
responsible for the prisoner’s care.
Third, complicated prison grievance policies often
interfere with prisoner ability to redress prison conditions and
prisoner rights violations in federal courts should the grievance
process fail. In 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that
the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires that prisoners
properly exhaust all available administrative remedies before
access to federal courts, including the prisoner grievance process
set by the prison facility in which the incarcerated person is
housed.237 Furthermore, the Court in Woodford v. Ngo
interpreted the PLRA’s exhaustion provision to completely bar
lawsuits if prisoners fail to comply with any procedural elements
of a facility grievance policy.238 Under Woodford, even minor
procedural good faith errors might render a prisoner’s harm
unredressable administratively and/or with courts.
Finally, the covert nature of the prisoner grievance
process makes it difficult to identify systemic problems or
collectively address the problems that prisoners experience at
other facilities within a system. Although many states maintain
statistical information for the number of grievances filed, few
share the success rate of these grievances and a number do not
share and/or maintain statistical information about prisoner
grievances at all.239
3. Prisoner Litigation
When a prisoner grievance fails, the next line of recourse
a prisoner has in exercising rights or leveraging better prison
conditions and treatment is litigation. Prisoner litigation has
been largely ineffective in promoting prison population reductions
and improving prison conditions, however, because of the lack of
adequate legal representation for most prisoners. Additionally, a
number of extraordinary procedural requirements and limitations
make prisoner litigation generally ineffective at addressing the
problems created by mass incarceration.

237 Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321–
66, 1321–71 (1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 19973 (2012)); see also Woodford
v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84–85, 90 (2006).
238 Woodford, 458 U.S. at 90.
239 See KAUL ET AL., supra note 231, at 26–31.
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a. Access to Legal Counsel
Incarcerated people have very little access to the legal
counsel and resources necessary to address prison problems
through litigation. As discussed supra, most prisoners come from
situations of poverty, and many suffer from educational or mental
health deficits.240 Moreover, the Sixth Amendment right to a
public defender does not apply to post-conviction proceedings that
might address prison conditions.241 Hence, court-appointed
attorneys for indigent prisoners are generally not available to
litigate issues related to prisoner rights and prison conditions.
Although prisoners have a right to access the courts,242
the Supreme Court has stated that prisoners have no right to
access prison law libraries or other legal materials that would
assist in criminal appeals, § 1983 claims, or habeas corpus
actions.243 In 1977, the Supreme Court held in Bounds v. Smith
that states have an obligation to provide adequate law libraries
or acceptable alternative means of acquiring legal knowledge.244
The Supreme Court severely limited the breadth of this holding,
however, when it decided Lewis v. Casey almost twenty years
later. The Court held that prison administrators have virtually
no affirmative duties to ensure prisoners have access to courts
and prisoners possess no affirmative rights to materials that
would aid in the preparation of legal pleadings.245 As a result,
prisoner meaningful access to legal materials and assistance in
prisons has severely diminished in the years since Lewis.246
Finally, the “jailhouse lawyer” usually does not exist and
may be lawfully suppressed from assisting other inmates if the
state provides some reasonable alternative to assist inmates
legally.247 Additionally, the Supreme Court decided in Shaw v.
240 Not only do prison demographics reflect a population that face mental health
challenges, but “a high percentage of persons who are totally or functionally illiterate,
whose educational attainments are slight, and whose intelligence is limited.” Johnson v.
Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 487 (1969).
241 Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 314–15 (1976); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539, 569–70 (1974).
242 See Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15, 15 (1971) (per curiam); Johnson, 393
U.S. at 485; Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 549 (1941).
243 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350–51 (1996).
244 Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 817–18 (1977).
245 Lewis, 518 U.S. at 350. According to the Lewis majority, the State has only
negative duties such as “prohibiting state prison officials from actively interfering with
inmates’ attempts to prepare legal documents . . . and . . . requiring state courts to waive
filing fees . . . or transcript fees . . . for indigent inmates” and had virtually no affirmative
duties to ensure prisoners have access to courts. Id. (citations omitted).
246 DAVIS, supra note 34, at 57–59 (discussing the disestablishment of
educational programs in prisons).
247 While Johnson v. Avery recognized the right of inmates to associate in the
preparation of legal actions and that without the assistance of jailhouse lawyers, many
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Murphy that prisoners have no right to contact other prisoners for
the purpose of legal services.248
b. Procedural Hurdles to Litigation
Following the prisoner rights movement of the 1960s, and
the resulting explosion of prisoner litigation in federal court, the
Supreme Court and Congress established a number of additional
mandates that severely limit prisoner-plaintiff access to federal
court.249 For example, in 1995, the Supreme Court decided Sandin
v. Conner, requiring that prisoners asserting due process
violations illustrate that the prisoner has suffered an “atypical
and significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents
of prison life.”250 As the dissent in Sandin predicted, lower federal
courts have had significant difficulty deciding when prisoners have
suffered an “atypical and significant hardship,” and prisoners have
had difficulty meeting this confusing burden.251
A year later, the Supreme Court made litigation even more
difficult for prisoner-plaintiffs by creating additional pleading
requirements specific only to prisoners. In Lewis v. Casey, the
Court examined the right of prisoner access to courts and decided
the constitutional right of access to courts does not create an
affirmative right of prisoner access to adequate prison law
libraries.252 Under Lewis, before a prisoner may claim denial of a
right of access to court, prisoners must illustrate that the claim
the prisoner would have brought—had the prisoner been afforded

prisoners would never be able to bring effective claims, there is no recognized
constitutional right for the jailhouse lawyer to provide legal services if the prison provide
other alternatives. Johnson, 393 U.S. at 490. Literature supports that prison lawyer
assistance is generally effective. See John F. Meyers, Comment, The Writ-Writers:
Jailhouse Lawyers Right of Meaningful Access to the Courts, 18 AKRON L. REV. 649, 650
(1985) (“Jailhouse lawyers do not have the travel difficulties that outside counsel may
have; they are compatible with the prison population and the types of problems that exist
in the prison; they are inexpensive; they are able to screen the frivolous claims even more
quickly than attorneys.”).
248 Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 225, 231 (2001).
249 See generally Susan N. Herman, Slashing and Burning Prisoner’s Rights:
Congress and the Supreme Court in Dialogue, 77 OR. L. REV. 1229 (1998) (describing in
detail the “counter-revolution” that disadvantages prisoner-plaintiffs).
250 Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).
251 Id. at 490 n.2. This is because the “ordinary incidents” of prison life vary
greatly by prison facility and jurisdiction and the Supreme Court has not given guidance
as to what constitutes “the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id.; see also Wilkinson v.
Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 223 (2005) (“In Sandin’s wake the Courts of Appeals have not reached
consistent conclusions for identifying the baseline from which to measure what is atypical
and significant in any particular prison system. . . . This divergence indicates the difficulty
of locating the appropriate baseline . . . .”).
252 See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350–51 (1996).
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opportunity to research the claim or were provided other
appropriate legal assistance—would have been nonfrivolous.253
Finally, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA),
enacted by Congress in 1996 presents a number of obstacles to
prisoner-plaintiffs.254 Because the PLRA was passed in response
to the influx of prisoner litigation in federal courts, it contains
several provisions specifically designed to limit the number of
prisoner lawsuits.255 Under the PLRA, if a plaintiff fails to meet
any one of the many procedural requirements, they also lose the
right to relief in federal court.
Most significantly, the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement
has proven to be one of the more difficult obstacles for prisoners
to overcome.256 Additionally, the PLRA: (1) severely limits the
type of relief prisoner plaintiffs may be awarded; (2) imposes a
provision barring court access after three unsuccessful forma
pauperis actions; (3) limits attorney fees that may be recouped
by prisoners; (4) outlines provisions instructing loss of good time
if the court finds that the prisoner’s claim was malicious or
harassing; and (5) requires that prisoners suffer a physical
injury before relief may be requested, discouraging claims for
prisoners who have only suffered mental or emotional harms.257
The provisions of the PLRA have also been held to apply
to juvenile cases.258 Given the fact that many prisoners suffer from
253 See id. at 352–53. Critics of Lewis have compared the ruling to the “civil
death” prisoners experienced upon incarceration in the nineteenth and early twentieth
century. See Herman, supra note 249, at 1232.
254 Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321–
66 (1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2012)).
255 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (2012); see also Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516,
524–25 (2002) (stating, “[b]eyond doubt, Congress enacted § 1997e(a) to reduce the quantity
and improve the quality of prisoner suits”); Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV.
L. REV. 1555, 1634 (2003) (“The most dramatic effect of the PLRA on individual
inmate cases has been the decrease in district court filings coded by the Administrative Office
as inmate civil rights cases.”); Kathleen J. McCabe, Comment, Woodford v. Ngo: Creating A
Barrier to Justice Using the PLRA Exhaustion Provision, 17 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV.
277, 302 (2007) (“Legislative history indicates that one of the goals of the PLRA was to reduce
the quantity of prisoner suits brought in federal court.” (footnote omitted)).
256 See McCabe, supra note 255 at 302.
257 The PLRA states:

The court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court
finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to
correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means
necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right. The court shall give
substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a
criminal justice system caused by the relief.
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321–66 (1996)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (2012).
258 Lewis ex rel. Lewis v. Gagne, 281 F. Supp. 2d 429, 433 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding
that PLRA applies to minors who are adjudicated delinquent and civilly detained).
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mental health conditions, have limited education, and limited
access to legal services,259 the requirements of Sandin, Lewis, and
the PLRA are particularly daunting.260 The PLRA’s limitations
suggest the proposed right of prisoner-to-public communication
might be the only potential for recourse for many prisoners.
4. Federal Court Oversight
Given the numerous prisoner litigation obstacles and the
federal court tradition of judicial restraint in prison
administration, the threat of federal oversight of prisons has
been ineffective in promoting reduction of prison populations
and improving conditions. Even after numerous years and
threats of federal takeover, instances of federal courts and
agencies taking control of a states’ entire deteriorating prison
systems are rare.261 Federal court intervention typically begins
with prisoner lawsuits claiming a pattern of problems or
constitutional violations in a facility. Thus, the federal
government does not unilaterally decide what prisons need
attention, and prisoners must typically first satisfy the
numerous obstacles of litigating in federal court as described,
supra.262 In the rare instance that such prisoner lawsuits are
successful, the lawsuit may well result in a consent decree or
memorandum of agreement where the state agrees to turn over
authority of some or all of its corrections system to the
Department of Justice or a federal judge.
States are typically highly resistant to the federal
takeover route because federal intervention is costly263 and
See supra Section IV.C.3.
As a side note, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA) has also presented serious obstacles for people in state prisons seeking federal
writ of habeas corpus relief from a federal court, including a one-year statute of
limitations on habeas claims. See Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat 1214; John H. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the
“Bite”, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259, 291–92 (2006).
261 Take Oklahoma’s prison problems for example, where all three of its female
prisons operate well over maximum population levels, at 129 percent design capacity.
The Oklahoma prison system has been entangled in budget deficits and deteriorating
conditions for a number of years, but federal takeover has not advanced. See Ben Botkin,
Weighing the Odds of a Federal Takeover of State Prisons, OKLA. WATCH,
http://oklahomawatch.org/2017/12/17/weighing-the-odds-of-a-federal-takeover-of-state-prisons
[https://perma.cc/X5HU-3]; see also Cindy Chang & Joel Ruben, After Years of Scandal,
L.A. Jails Get Federal Oversight, Sweeping Reforms, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2015, 7:10 PM)
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-federal-jail-oversight-20150804-story.html
[https://perma.cc/26AN-XPF5].
262 See discussion supra, notes 236–260.
263 See William A. Taggart, Redefining the Power of the Federal Judiciary: The
Impact of Court-Ordered Prison Reform on State Expenditures for Corrections, 23 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 241, 248 (1989) (“Judicial influence on state spending is neither direct or
259
260
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threatens to cripple states from making their own prison policy
decisions.264 In light of budget deficits often leading to the
conditions warranting takeover, corrections departments often
turn to the for-profit industry for relief in running their prison
systems, an industry which faces its own problems, hurdles, and
obstacles to regulation.265
5. The United States Department of Justice & Civil
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act
The United States Department of Justice’s authority
under Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA) has
also not been effective in addressing mass incarceration and the
resulting conditions. CRIPA was passed in 1980 to protect the
rights of prisoners and individuals at other state residential
institutions.266 CRIPA authorizes the Department of Justice
(DOJ), at the attorney general’s request, to investigate
conditions at correctional facilities run by state or local
governments to determine whether violations of the
Constitution or federal law exist.267 Under CRIPA, the DOJ may
file a lawsuit against the state if a DOJ investigation reveals
that the facility has demonstrated a “pattern or practice” of
denying civil rights and the conditions are so “egregious or
flagrant,” prisoners have been subjected to “grievous harm.”268
The DOJ’s resources and capacity to handle the influx of
complaints and inquiries it receives about the thousands of
prisons, jails, and other facilities to which CRIPA applies is one
of the biggest limitations of the DOJ addressing reform. In 2016,
for example, the DOJ received over seven thousand CRIPArelated citizen complaint letters, emails, and inquiries from the
overt; attention is focused on what must be done to improve prison conditions should a
state desire to keep the doors of its facilities open.”).
264 David C. Fathi, The Challenge of Prison Oversight, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1453, 1454 (2010).
265 See id. at 1461–62. (“Approximately eight percent of all U.S. prisoners, and
fifteen percent of federal prisoners, are housed in privately operated correctional institutions,
making these facilities a significant and growing part of the correctional landscape. Private
facilities present a special oversight problem. While the profit motive may increase the
temptation to cut corners on staffing, medical care, and other essential services, private
prisons are subject to even less scrutiny than their public counterparts. As private
corporations, they are typically not subject to open meeting and freedom of information laws
that apply to state and local departments of corrections.” (footnotes omitted)).
266 Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat.
349 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (2012)) (stating that CRIPA applies
to juvenile justice facilities, adult jails and prisons, nursing facilities, and facilities for
individuals with psychiatric or intellectual and developmental disabilities).
267 Id. at § 3, 94 Stat. 350 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1997a (2012)).
268 Id.
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White House and Congress;269 only four of the nation’s 1,821
prison facilities were under monitoring by the DOJ.270
Additionally, only two investigations were opened against
prisons in the DOJ under CRIPA: one a statewide investigation
of the Georgia Department of Corrections and the other an
investigation of the Fishkill Correctional Facility in New York.271
The DOJ issued no findings letters in reference to any of these
prison facilities.272
The way prison problems come to the attention of the DOJ
also renders CRIPA ineffective at addressing the many problems
caused by mass incarceration. Because of the voluminous number
of complaints received by the DOJ,273 CRIPA investigations are
often responsive to conditions that are widely publicized through
the media.274 A systematic representation of harm must be
present before the Department of Justice will take action.275
Prisons that have the most egregious conditions can slide under
the radar, simply because of a tighter lid on violations by the
facility. As described supra, a number of limitations on prisoner
free speech impair the ability of prisoners to communicate with
members of the public, media, and, therefore, the DOJ for
purposes of seeking prison condition improvements.276
Additionally, local facilities can push back on CRIPA
investigation requests and sometimes do.277 State facilities

269 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ACTIVITIES UNDER THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF
INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSON ACT FISCAL YEAR 2016, 10 (2016), https://www.justice.gov/crt/
page/file/1019881/download [https://perma.cc/LT43-UPEY].
270 Id. at 7.
271 Id. at 8.
272 See id. at 8. A findings letter generally sets out all problematic conditions,
practices, and policies of a facility following initial and subsequent investigations by the
Department of Justice. See id. at 2, 8.
273 See Rights of Persons Confined to Jails and Prisons, DEP’T OF JUST. (Aug. 8,
2015), https://www.justice.gov/crt/rights-persons-confined-jails-and-prisons [https://perma.cc/
E2PQ-CPB3] (“We receive hundreds of reports of potential violations each week. We collect
this information and it informs our case selection. We may sometimes use it as evidence in an
existing case. However, we cannot bring a case based on every report we receive.”).
274 Alex Hecht, Civil Rights of Institutionalized People, 36 MD. B.J., no. 1,
Jan./Feb. 2003, at 33, 34 (“CRIPA actions often involve a state-run mental hospital or
facility that has been maligned or widely publicized in the media. ACRIPA investigation
may also coincide with a widely publicized death of a resident, say, by medication
overdose. Affected patients and residents may also alert DOJ to unhealthy and
hazardous conditions.”).
275 According to the Department of Justice website, “[e]vidence of harm to one
individual only—even if that harm is serious—is not enough” and only if the Department
finds systemic problems will it “send the state or local government a letter that describes
the problems and what says what steps they must take to fix them.” See DEP’T OF JUST.,
supra note 273.
276 See supra Section III.B.
277 See Fred Cohen, Overreaching & Underachieving: The Justice Department &
Juvenile Facilities, 46 No. 2 CRIM. L. BULL. ART 2, 1, 2–9 (2010). Cohen questions whether
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typically set at least some of the terms and parameters of
investigations. Those terms and parameters can serve to deflect
DOJ monitors from fundamental problems at a facility. Finally,
the effectiveness of the DOJ in using CRIPA authority toward
facility reforms is strongly tied to the prosecutorial objectives of
the Department, which can vary significantly from one
administration to the next.
The covert nature of prison regulation and vast obstacles
to prisoner grievances and litigation warrant consideration of
the proposed prisoner-to-public communication right.
CONCLUSION
It is perplexing why any group of American citizens would
need to engage in a hunger strike on U.S. soil in order to be
heard.278 As we evaluate our own personage and criminal justice
philosophy in seeking reforms that would create significant and
sustainable reductions in prison populations, the unfettered
prisoner narrative is essential. Providing prison accountability
and transparency through unfettered access to the prisoner
narrative would encourage prison policies and practices focused
more appropriately on prisoner rehabilitation and public safety.
In light of the well-documented problems with the criminal justice
system for politically powerless groups and knowing what we
now know about prison regulation, recognizing an unqualified
and unfettered right of public-to-prisoner communication is a
necessary step toward transformative criminal justice reform.

the DOJ has a right of access under CRIPA. Id. at 2. In discussing the weaknesses of the
DOJ’s approach to reform in youth facility investigations and findings, Cohen states:
There is no measure aimed at the requisite quantity or minimal quality of mental
health care providers; nothing on mental health units, admission and discharge
criteria; nothing on treatment teams and the inclusion of security-oriented staff,
training—and much more is missing. Thus, we have the Justice Department
doing too much yet failing to do enough; the dilemma of a misguided reformer.
Id. at 9.
278

See discussion supra, Introduction.

